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Abstract 
 
This dissertation argues that the protections for vulnerable accused in Malaysian criminal trials are not sufficient. 
It is crucial to ensure that vulnerable accused receive proper treatment when dealing with the court. After 
thoroughly scrutinising the law and practice in several other jurisdictions, this dissertation proposes several 
amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code and the Evidence Act 1950 to provide clear guidelines as to how to 
deal with vulnerable accused in a criminal trial. It is ultimately recommended that the right to give an unsworn 
statement be modified so that it is more effective and fair in its operation. This dissertation further recommends the 
introduction of an adverse inference clause for the right to remain silent at trial so accused person can better 
understand the effect of their choice. Recommendations are also made to introduce an intermediary service for 
those vulnerable accused who choose to give sworn evidence in court, and to allow a support person to accompany 
a vulnerable accused during trial. These amendments aim to assist vulnerable accused persons physically and 
emotionally, and to protect their fair trial rights. 
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, appendix and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 33,464 words. 
 
Subjects and Topics 
Vulnerable accused 
Right to give an unsworn statement with restriction against cross-examination 
Right to remain silent 
Intermediary service 
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I Introduction 
 
Every person deserves to be treated fairly in a criminal trial process; this includes an accused 
person. Every accused has the right to a fair trial. This is a fundamental safeguard of one‘s 
human rights.
1
 Extra protections are even necessary for accused who are vulnerable. Hence, 
the provision of proper protections to ensure vulnerable accused are properly guided 
throughout the trial process is part and parcel of the standard required for a fair trial.
2
 
In Malaysia, the meaning of the term ―vulnerable person‖ in the context of criminal trials is 
not clear. My dissertation submits that it is crucial to have a proper definition of what 
constitutes a vulnerable person in the Malaysian criminal justice system because this type of 
accused may have trouble in engaging with the process of the court. Although such persons 
may understand what is going on and therefore be deemed fit to stand trial, it may be difficult 
for them to fully appreciate the court‘s proceedings without some form of assistance. A 
number of jurisdictions provide protections for vulnerable accused, but little protection is 
currently available in the Malaysian criminal justice system. My dissertation aims to examine 
whether the protections for vulnerable accused in Malaysian criminal trials are sufficient for a 
trial to be considered fair, and to suggest possible improvements. At the moment, one of the 
mechanisms to provide fair treatment to the accused in Malaysia is seen in the Criminal 
Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as ―the Code‖), which offers three options when An 
accused is called to enter a defence in court. These options are well explained in s 173 of the 
Code, which provides as follows: 
(ha) When the Court calls upon the accused to enter on his defence under 
subparagraph (h) (i), the Court shall read and explain the three options to the 
accused which are as follows: 
(i) to give sworn evidence in the witness box; 
(ii) to give unsworn statement from the dock; or 
(iii) to remain silent. 
 
One of the choices available is unusual in international terms, and that is the right to give an 
unsworn statement (hereinafter referred to as ―the RUS‖). The RUS has been abolished in 
most Commonwealth jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that a reverse 
scenario is seen in the Malaysian criminal procedure where a step contrary to other 
Commonwealth countries was taken by making the RUS more prominent under the Code. 
The RUS was a substantive right prior to 2007. It was adopted from English criminal 
                                                          
1
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), (1948), art 10; The European Convention of 
Human Rights, art 6. 
2
 A thorough examination of the principle of a fair trial is beyond the scope of this dissertation. It will be 
discussed only intermittently. 
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procedure by invoking s 5 of the Code. This provision gives permission for the criminal 
procedure in England to be followed when such procedure is not available in Malaysia, as 
long as it is not in conflict with the Code. However, it was apparently preserved in the 
legislation when the Code was amended through the Malaysian Criminal Procedure 
(Amendment) Act 2006 and the law came into force on 7 September 2007.
3
  
The Code also provides for the right to remain silent at trial (hereinafter referred to as ―the 
RRS‖). An accused has the freedom to say nothing during the defence case to avoid making a 
self-incriminatory statement. In overseas jurisdictions, the law expressly explains that an 
adverse inference will be drawn from the accused‘s silence.4 In Malaysia, the law is silent on 
the inference to be drawn but it does require the judge to explain the consequence of the right. 
My dissertation highlights that the RRS creates an awkward situation in Malaysia. This is 
because, rather than focusing on the original purpose of the RRS, that is to protect the 
accused against self-incriminatory statement, it has been established by the Malaysian 
judiciary as one of the key elements to establish prima facie case. The scenario is; when the 
prosecution has successfully adduced credible evidence to prove each ingredient of the 
offence, and if the accused chooses to remain silent, an automatic conviction will follow. 
This is where the RRS becomes ineffective as protection to vulnerable accused. My 
dissertation suggests that the existing rights (RUS and RRS) that are intended to protect the 
interest of a vulnerable accused do not achieve the objectives for which they were originally 
formulated. The problems with the current Malaysian approach, and possible reforms, are 
considered in detail in this dissertation. 
 
A Scope of this Dissertation 
 
Theoretically, although it seems that Malaysian criminal procedure provides sufficient rights 
to an accused, as apparent from its Code, in reality none of the rights operate to really benefit 
vulnerable accused. Uncertainty about the evidential status of the RUS allows the possibility 
that the statement will not be viewed as evidence to support the accused‘s case. Hence, the 
possibility of an innocent and vulnerable accused being convicted because of a failure to raise 
doubt is great. Meanwhile, the RRS is more concerned with how a prima facie case is reached 
than it is a tool to protect the accused against self-incriminatory statements. Therefore, I 
argue that the welfare of the vulnerable accused in Malaysian criminal trials is threatened by 
current processes. This is because not only are the rights offered in s 173(ha) insufficient as 
protections to the accused in general, but there is also very little additional assistance 
available to vulnerable accused who may find the court process daunting. The possible reason 
                                                          
3
Section 21; Salim Ali Farrar ―The ‗New‘ Malaysian Criminal Procedure: Criminal Procedure (Amendment) 
Act 2006‖ (2009) 4 Asian Criminology 129 at 129. 
4
 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (E&W), s 35; Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 20(2); Evidence Act 
2006(NZ), s 33; Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (Singapore), 230(1)(m). 
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this scenario is happening in Malaysia is because the law in that country gives little attention 
to whether an accused might be vulnerable. I argue that if the term ―vulnerable person‖ is 
defined precisely, and appropriate assistance is available for the benefit of these accused, it 
would reduce the flaw of the rights currently available to the accused and would be a 
platform to introduce other relevant assistance for them in the future. I argue that vulnerable 
accused persons need better protections. Hence, there have to be effective safeguards in the 
Malaysian justice system to shelter these accused and thereby prevent unfair proceedings. My 
dissertation determines a practical approach to protect the interests of vulnerable accused 
when dealing with the court process in a Malaysian criminal trial.  
 
B The Structure of this Dissertation 
 
My dissertation recommends step-by-step measures to improve the treatment of vulnerable 
accused by the Malaysian criminal justice system, beginning with a proposal to define who is 
a vulnerable person in the Malaysian criminal context. I argue that if this is done, it may help 
to determine proper assistance to be given to a vulnerable accused by the court. To achieve 
this aim, in Chapter II I discuss the term ―vulnerable person‖ as it is found in other 
jurisdictions. I suggest the Malaysian legislature should amend the Code to incorporate the 
definition of a vulnerable person in criminal procedures. I argue in that chapter that when the 
term ―vulnerable person‖ is properly defined, it makes it easier to determine the relevant 
assistance that needs to be provided for vulnerable accused.  
Then I move on to discuss the current protections for vulnerable accused in Malaysia in 
Chapter III. I discuss in detail the current approach to the RUS in the Malaysian criminal 
justice system. It is important to examine the RUS thoroughly because the government chose 
to retain the right rather than abolish it in the name of justice to the accused. Hence it is 
crucial to determine how far it helps vulnerable accused. I make comparisons with the 
relevant law and practice in other Commonwealth jurisdictions such as England and Wales, 
New Zealand, Australia and Singapore. The discussion explains why the RUS in Malaysia 
today is problematic. I argue this right creates more disadvantages than advantages for the 
vulnerable accused. I then propose how to mend the situation by offering a more effective 
approach. I suggest the RUS could be modified so that it applies only to vulnerable accused. 
To this effect, I recommend the use of unsworn evidence as practised overseas as a relevant 
source of reference. However, I propose the core element of the unsworn statement, which is 
the restriction against cross-examination, should remain. I suggest the provision regarding the 
unsworn statement should be inserted into the Malaysian Evidence Act 1950. That 
amendment would make reform of the RUS more realistic in an environment where it has 
considerable public and political support. In Chapter IV I explain how the RRS is treated in 
Malaysia. In assessing whether the RRS offers sufficient protections for vulnerable accused 
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in Malaysia, the discussion will focus on the RRS at trial. The RRS at the pre-trial stage will 
be discussed only where necessary. It is obvious in this Chapter that the RRS does not receive 
the same respect as it does in other jurisdictions. I discuss that less attention is given to the 
reasons behind the decision to remain silent, as the court will look at the silence from a 
different perspective than that adopted by courts in other jurisdictions, that is, as a test to 
determine whether a prima facie case has been made by the prosecution or not. I also clarify 
in this Chapter that the law in Malaysia does not provide clear guidelines on how to explain 
the effect of silence to the accused. This could be detrimental to the accused who is 
unrepresented and the situation is more serious to the vulnerable accused. Therefore, I 
suggest the Code to be amended to introduce an adverse inference on the accused‘s silence 
and also put clearly the explanation that should be read by the court to accused who choose to 
remain silent. The Singapore Criminal Procedure Code 2010 is referred to for this purpose. 
To discuss further protections for the vulnerable accused in Malaysia, in Chapter V I examine 
an intermediary service, as available in England and Wales. I highlight the benefits that the 
vulnerable accused might gain from this service. Malaysia also provides for an intermediary 
service, but it is only for child witnesses. Therefore, I suggest the Code be amended to 
provide the service to vulnerable accused. This service will be beneficial to vulnerable 
accused who choose to give sworn evidence in court. I also suggest having the service 
available to vulnerable accused/suspects as early as during the police investigation. In 
Chapter VI, I discuss another form of assistance available in New Zealand and Australia. 
These countries allow for support persons to vulnerable accused at trial. Quite similar 
assistance is also available in Malaysia, but again it is only applicable to child witnesses. I 
submit in this Chapter that this assistance is also very useful for vulnerable accused, who may 
be overwhelmed by the court process. This assistance is more related to the emotional well-
being of the accused. I therefore propose the Code be amended to include a provision for 
support persons for vulnerable accused during trial proceedings. I argue that it may not be too 
demanding for the Malaysian legislature to consider an intermediary service and support 
persons to be available for vulnerable accused, since such assistance already exists in its 
justice system, but with a narrower scope. These proposed amendments aim to do justice to 
the vulnerable accused person in the Malaysian criminal court while maintaining fairness for 
all participants and parties. 
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II Vulnerable Persons in the Context of Criminal Trials 
 
A proper definition of who is considered to be vulnerable in court is very important. This is 
because only when the term ―vulnerable person‖ is defined does the necessity of providing 
appropriate assistance become obvious and relevant. Unfortunately, no such terminology 
exists in the Malaysian criminal justice system. This may be one reason vulnerable accused 
do not receive proper treatment when dealing with the criminal justice system.  
Part A of this chapter discusses the definition of a vulnerable person in other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions. It also discusses whether a vulnerable accused is fit to stand trial or not. Then, 
in Part B I discuss the Malaysian approach in determining an accused‘s fitness to stand trial. I 
highlight that the scope for fitness to stand trial in Malaysia is very narrow, because the law 
lacks ways to deal with accused who suffer from disabilities other than unsoundness of mind. 
In Part C, I propose the Code should be amended to define who is a vulnerable person for the 
purpose of the Code. I recommend following the New South Wales Criminal Procedure Act 
1986 to achieve this aim. 
 
A Who is a Vulnerable Person 
 
The definition of a vulnerable person varies in each jurisdiction. It is worth comparing the 
overseas terminology on vulnerable persons to consider examples for Malaysia. The New 
South Wales Criminal Procedure Act 1986 defines ―vulnerable person‖ as including a 
cognitively impaired person, which includes the categories of persons with an intellectual 
disability, a developmental disorder (including an autistic spectrum disorder), a neurological 
disorder, dementia, a severe mental illness, or a brain injury.
5
 However, the law in England 
and Wales gives a narrow definition of a vulnerable person as someone who suffers from 
intellectual impairment.
6
 This definition is given specifically for the purpose of providing 
assistance for vulnerable witnesses under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. 
Brendan O‘Mahony, a forensic psychologist and Registered Intermediary, recommended that 
―the wording in the legislation should be amended so that the term vulnerable person 
explicitly includes more general cognitive impairment and not only diagnoses of learning 
disability.‖7 Meanwhile, in New Zealand, the term ―vulnerable adult‖ is only defined to suit 
the Crimes Act 1961, which includes persons with mental impairment, but the definition 
refers to victims rather than to accused persons.
8
 However, the New Zealand Criminal 
                                                          
5
Section 306M. 
6
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (E&W), s 16. 
7Brendan O‘Mahony ―The Emerging Role of the Registered Intermediary with the Vulnerable Witness and 
Offender: Facilitating Communication with the Police and Members of the Judiciary‖ (2009) 38 British Journal 
of Learning Disabilities 232 at 236. 
8
 Section 2. 
6 
 
 
 
Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 is the relevant legislation to deal with 
accused who might be regarded as vulnerable persons. In determining a person‘s 
vulnerability, the legislation depends on the definition of intellectual disability as interpreted 
in the New Zealand Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003, 
which gives a very detailed definition of a person with an intellectual disability, which also 
includes mental impairment.
9
  
In Malaysia, the Code does not specifically provide a definition of a vulnerable person from 
the criminal justice perspective. However, the Malaysian Persons with Disabilities Act 2008 
provides a general definition of persons with disabilities as ―those who have long term 
physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various 
barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society‖.10 Furthermore, the 
Malaysian Mental Health Act 2001 also provides a definition of ―mental disorder‖ as: 11 
Any mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of the mind, psychiatric disorder or 
any other disorder or disability of the mind however acquired; and ―mentally disordered‖ 
shall be construed accordingly.  
Despite the availability of the provision that defines persons with disabilities and mental 
disorder, the criminal justice system does not attempt to address how these persons might 
struggle with the criminal process in the event they are charged in court. The law does deal 
with a child witness with a disability,
12
 but this does not include a child accused.
13
 I submit 
that it should not be too difficult for the government of Malaysia to deal with this issue since 
reliable resources (i.e. Mental Health Act and the Persons with Disabilities Act) are available 
to determine the definition of a vulnerable person in the context of the criminal procedure. 
1 Is a vulnerable accused with intellectual disability or mental disorder fit to stand 
trial? 
 
In some overseas jurisdictions, an accused who has a permanent intellectual impairment with 
such a degree of severity as to result in his or her being unable to participate in the trial 
process will be found unfit to stand trial.
14
 Furthermore, this type of accused might not be 
able to instruct and/or communicate effectively with counsel and might be unable to 
understand the nature of the proceedings.
15
 It is a common law practices that if a person is not 
                                                          
9
Section 7; Barton v R [2012] NZLJ 269 at [93]-[100]. 
10
 Section 2. 
11
 Section 2(1). 
12
 Evidence of Child Witness Act 2007(Malaysia), s 12. 
13
 Section 2. 
14
Warren Brookbanks Competencies of Trial: Fitness to Plead in New Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2011) 
at [8.2]; Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003, s 7; Criminal Procedure 
(Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 (E&W), s 2. 
15
Brookbanks, above n 14, at [5.1] and [8.6.1]; Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003(NZ), 
s 4(1); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 311(1); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 269H; Criminal Justice 
(Mental Impairment) Act 1999 (Tas), s 8; Crimes(Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997(Vic), 
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able to understand or answer the charge against him or her, no criminal charge can be made 
in a court of law.
16
  
 
However, in any other situation, an accused with an intellectual disability or mental disorder 
may be found fit to stand trial if the disability is not unduly severe and is concerned with a 
particular disability to do something.
17
 In such a case, relevant assistance is provided to the 
accused in order to minimise the gap between an accused without any disability and the 
accused with a disability. An accused with vulnerability may not be able to cope with the 
court‘s process well. Therefore, it is crucial that he or she understands the trial proceedings 
and, without assistance, it might be difficult for him or her. With appropriate support, this 
type of accused may be able to stand trial without being deprived of a fair trial. The approach 
of Malaysian law on fitness to stand trial is discussed next. 
 
B Fitness to Stand Trial in Malaysia 
 
In Malaysia, the court has the statutory duty to determine whether an accused is fit to stand 
trial or not.
18
 An accused is found unfit to plead if he or she falls under the definition of 
unsound mind in s 342 of the Code. Moreover, the Malaysian Penal Code explains that a 
person of unsound mind does not commit an offence.
19
 In terms of procedure, when the court 
becomes suspicious of the accused‘s sanity, it will investigate the matter by ordering the 
accused to be observed by a medical officer in a psychiatric hospital to determine whether the 
accused is fit to stand trial or not.
20
 If the accused is found unfit to plead, and if the offence is 
bailable, the court may release the accused if satisfied that the accused will not do harm to 
himself or herself or to others. If the offence is unbailable, the accused will be subject to the 
order of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (High King of the Federation), if it is in federal territory 
or to the Ruler if in a state, to keep the accused in a psychiatric hospital. Unfortunately, the 
Code does not give clear guidelines on how should the courts determine an accused‘s fitness 
to stand trial, as available in other jurisdictions.
21
 Some judges are of the opinion that the 
medical officer‘s report should not be the only mechanism to determine an accused‘s fitness 
to stand trial. In the case of Public Prosecutor v Misbah bin Saat, the court held:
22
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
s 6; Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996 (WA), s 9; R v Pritchard (1836) 7 Car & P 303 at 
304,(1836) 173 ER 135 at 135; R v Walls [2011] EWCA Crim 443 at [21]. 
16
Brookbanks, above n 14 at [5.1]. 
17
At [8.1.1]. 
18
 PP v Ismail Bin Ibrahim [1998] 3 MLJ 243 at 243. 
19
 Section 84. 
20
 Criminal Procedure Code (Malaysia), chapter XXXIII.  
21
 Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996 (WA), s 9; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 311; Crimes 
(Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic), s 6; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), 
s 269H; Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003(NZ), s 4(1). 
22
 Public Prosecutor v Misbah bin Saat [1997] 3 MLJ 495 at [38]. 
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Though not relevant for the purposes of the present application, I am, however, of the view 
that some of these principles ought to be adopted in Malaysia. Stanley Yeo Meng Heong, 
Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore – in an article 
entitled ‗Fitness to Plead in Criminal Proceedings‘ [1984] 2 MLJ lxxxiv – is of the view 
that some of these English principles may be applicable in Malaysia by virtue of s 5 of the 
CPC: see note 10 of the article. The learned writer further states (at p lxxxv): 
 
The [Criminal Procedure] Code does not define the phrase ‗unsoundness of mind‘ nor  does 
it state the factors which are relevant in determining whether an accused is incapable of 
making his defence ….The factors to be considered in assessing the accused's mental 
condition at the time of the inquiry or trial are those which have evolved under English 
common law. These factors are whether the accused has sufficient intellect: (i) to understand 
the nature of the charge and the possible consequences of a finding of guilt; (ii) to instruct 
his legal counsel; (iii) to understand the [*505] substance of the evidence against him; and 
(iv) to understand the course of the proceedings at the trial so as to make a proper defence. 
A fifth factor of having sufficient intellect to challenge jurors is relevant in Malaysia where 
jury trials continue to be held [now no longer applicable]. 
 
In the event the accused is found fit to stand trial, the court will proceed with the trial.
23
 
However, he or she is allowed to depend on the defence of insanity or unsoundness of mind 
in s 84 of the Penal Code to raise the issue of absence of mens rea.
24
  
The above discussion shows that the requirements relating how to determine the fitness of an 
accused to stand trial in Malaysia are very narrow. They focus only on an accused who is of 
unsound mind or who is insane. Discussion about an accused who is suffering from other 
kinds of mental diseases is very limited. The law does not explain what should happen to an 
accused who is not insane but suffers some kind of mental disorder/impairment as explained 
in the Persons with Disabilities Act 2008. This is because being unfit to stand trial does not 
necessarily mean the accused has to be insane or unsound of mind. A mentally disabled or 
disordered accused might also be unfit to stand trial.
25
 It may not be a good approach for the 
Code to only depending on the term mental disorder and unsound mind/ insane to determine a 
person‘s fitness to plead. Previously, the same term (mental disorder) was used in New 
Zealand‘s Criminal Justice Act 1985 by referring to the New Zealand Mental Health 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 to indicate a person‘s competency to 
stand trial. However, there was a conflict over the common definition of the term ―mental 
disorder‖ in relation to an accused with an intellectual disability who was suspected to be 
unfit to stand trial.
26
 Therefore, to avoid confusion and to accomplish the aim of procedural 
                                                          
23
 Criminal Procedure Code (Malaysia), s 349. 
24
 Anita Abdul Rahim ―The Plea of Insanity and Diminished Responsibility Under the Malaysian and the 
English Criminal Law: A Comparative Approach‖ (2011) 1 LNS (A) Iiv at 11 of the PDF version (no hardcopy 
available). 
25
 R v Roberts (No 2) HC Auckland CRI-2005-092-14492, 22/11/06 at [56]-[57]; SR v R [2011] NZCA 409, 
[2011] 3 NZLR 638, at [157]; R v Sexton (2000) 77 SASR 405 at 416; Eastman v R [2000] HCA 29 at [59]. 
26
Brookbanks, above n 14, at [4.6.2]. 
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fairness in determining the competence of an accused to stand trial, the term ―mental 
disorder‖ was replaced with ―mental impairment‖.27 This happens because the term ―mental 
impairment‖ does not necessarily refer only to a person of unsound mind or who is insane, 
since it also includes persons with mental disabilities. Now, the scope is wider and a person 
with intellectual disabilities as defined under the New Zealand Intellectual Disability 
(Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003 may fall under the definition of mental 
impairment.
28
 The same situation is seen in Australia, particularly in the state of Victoria. The 
words ―mental impairment‖ are not defined in the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness 
to be Tried) Act 1997. As a result, the court relied on the common law defence of insanity to 
define the same. Therefore, the Victorian Law Reform Committee recommended that the 
legislation needed to be amended to make clear the intention of the law that the provisions in 
the statutes are associated with insanity and not mental disability.
29
  
I argue that it is important for the law in Malaysia to give more attention to accused who have 
a mental illness or disability to determine whether they are fit to stand trial or not. Accused 
who have a mental illness or disability are not necessarily rendered unfit to stand trial if they 
have sufficient comprehension of the nature of the proceedings.
30
 Therefore, when they are 
found fit to plead, relevant protections are required since they may not be as well-equipped as 
other accused without disability or disorder to understand and conduct an effective defence. 
Unfortunately, there is no provision in Malaysian law that deals with an accused who suffers 
from mental disabilities, but who is fit to stand trial. This leaves an impression that the 
criminal justice system in Malaysia does not see the necessity of having proper assistance for 
vulnerable accused in this category. Therefore, it is crucial for Malaysia to learn from other 
jurisdictions on who the potential vulnerable accused in Malaysia are and how to deal with 
them. This is important to make sure that the principle of a fair trial is adhered to. 
A vulnerable accused may find it difficult to become involved in the court process without 
proper assistance. At present, because of the lack of protections for vulnerable accused at 
trial, the law in Malaysia is seen to be insensitive to the plight of an accused person who has 
problems in coping with the court‘s proceedings due to his or her mental disability. It is 
somewhat surprising to see that even though the court is aware of the lack of understanding 
of the accused in the trial process, the law permits the court to continue with the proceedings 
without providing any reasonable assistance. This is evident in s 258 of the Code when it 
states:  
Section 258. Procedure where accused does not understand proceedings. 
                                                          
27
At [4.6.2]. 
28
 Bruce Robertson (ed) Adams on criminal law (online looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [CM4.13.01].  
29
 Law Reform Committee Inquiry into Access to and Interaction with the Justice System by People with an 
Intellectual Disability and their Families and Carers (VLRC PP216,2013) at xxv.  
30
 R v Daniel [2007] NZCA 15. 
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If the accused, though not insane, cannot be made to understand the proceedings the 
Court may proceed with the trial and, in the case of the Court of a Magistrate if the trial 
results in a conviction, the proceedings shall be forwarded to the High Court with a 
report of the circumstances of the case, and the Court of a Judge shall make therein such 
order or pass such sentence as it thinks fit. 
It is even more absurd when the provision explains that if the accused is convicted, the case 
should be brought before the High Court for an order or sentence to be passed. It is submitted 
that this would create a stir in a trial process since the case needs to be brought before two 
courts of different jurisdictions to be solved. Although the reason for this may be for the 
interests of the accused, in terms of providing an appropriate sentence to the accused and/or 
to satisfy the higher court that there is no miscarriage of justice in the proceeding, but this 
would be inefficient as it would cause delays in the disposal of the case. The deficiency in the 
procedure could be avoided if proper methods were practised to ensure those vulnerable 
accused are given the opportunity to give evidence in a fair manner. To achieve this, I 
propose the Code be amended to give a plain interpretation of a vulnerable person. That 
proposal is discussed next.  
 
C Recommendation: Definition of Vulnerable Person in the Malaysian Criminal 
Procedure Code 
 
After an analysis of the approaches of some Commonwealth countries in defining who is a 
vulnerable person, I submit that it is timely to do the same in the Malaysian justice system. I 
propose a clear definition of the words ―vulnerable person‖ be inserted in s 2 of the Code. For 
this purpose, the law in the New South Wales Criminal Procedure Act 1986 will be referred 
to.
 31
 The reason I propose to rely on this legislation is because the Act is drafted with 
attention to detail and it covers almost every important element of what constitutes a 
vulnerable person. This may avoid the likelihood of a vulnerable accused does not being 
unable to receive assistance because of an inadequacy in the interpretation of the word 
―impairment‖. Hence, it is easy to deal with the issue because the statute gives a 
straightforward answer to questions about what constitutes a vulnerable person. Besides, the 
definition in the New South Wales legislation may not be too different from the interpretation 
of disabilities within the context of the Mental Health Act 2001 and the Persons with 
Disabilities Act 2008 in Malaysia. Nevertheless, some modifications are suggested as 
highlighted below. 
The proposal for an additional interpretation in s 2 of the Code is as follows: 
 Section 2. Interpretation 
(1) In this Code- 
                                                          
31
 Section 306M. 
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"vulnerable person" means a witness or accused person who is a child or a cognitively 
impaired person of any age. For the purpose of this Code, a ―cognitive impairment‖ includes 
any of the following:  
(a) an intellectual disability,  
(b) a developmental disorder (including an autistic spectrum disorder),  
(c) a neurological disorder,  
(d) dementia,  
(e) a mental disorder (has the same meaning as s 2 of the Mental Health Act 2001),  
(f) a brain injury.  
 
The inclusion of the words ―witness or accused person‖ aims to give better understanding 
that this provision is applicable to vulnerable accused of any age in a criminal proceeding. It 
may help the court to determine who is eligible to be granted proper assistance. I also suggest 
the inclusion of an additional category that is ―a mental disorder‖ because from the 
discussion in Part C, the determination of one‘s fitness to stand trial (concerning the issue 
unsoundness of mind) in Malaysian criminal trial needs to be read together with the Mental 
Health Act. In addition, an accused of unsound mind may also be found fit to stand trial, as 
provided for in s 349 of the Code. For this reason, I find it is important to make sure that the 
accused of this category is defined as a vulnerable person to allow them to get access to 
proper assistance when making their defence in the court. Therefore, s 2 of the Code needs to 
be cross-referenced to the Mental Health Act 2001 in defining a vulnerable person in the 
context of criminal trials.  
 
D Possible Benefit from the Amendment 
 
It is reasonably clear that the law in Malaysia lacks a proper method to deal with a vulnerable 
accused who is fit to stand trial. I argue that when the Code provides for the definition of the 
term ―vulnerable person‖, which includes a vulnerable accused, it will become a stepping 
stone for the law in Malaysia to be more alert to the needs of vulnerable accused when 
dealing with the law and procedure. It will be much easier to introduce other relevant 
assistance to the vulnerable accused in future. Therefore, a vulnerable accused who is fit to 
stand trial will not be treated the same as the accused without any disabilities.  
A clear definition or interpretation of the term ―vulnerable person‖ may also help to reduce 
the possibilities of delays in court proceedings. This is because when the provision clearly 
12 
 
 
 
defines that relevant assistance is only applicable to those who fall under s 2, it would prevent 
the provision being extended to accused who are not eligible. Therefore, when the scope of 
assistance is narrowed down, the likelihood of abuse is also reduced. In addition, this 
amendment has a two-pronged effect. Instead of benefiting only an accused person at trial, 
the inclusion of the word ―witness‖ opens the scope wider so that ―vulnerable person‖ may 
include a suspect during the pre-trial phase. This provision might allow proper assistance to 
be provided to persons being examined by the police, as mentioned in s 112 of the Code. 
After the term ―vulnerable person‖ is defined, it is important to examine what would be the 
possible assistance available to a vulnerable accused who is found to be fit to stand trial in 
Malaysia. In the next chapter, I discuss in depth the current protection available in Malaysia, 
that is the RUS, and whether it is an effective safeguard of the interests of vulnerable accused 
in criminal trials.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
13 
 
 
 
III Current Protection: A Critical Analysis of the Rights to give an Unsworn 
Statement in Malaysian Criminal Trials 
 
This chapter presents a detailed analysis of the RUS provided for an accused person by the 
Malaysian criminal justice system. I critically analyse the actual functions of the RUS and 
whether the current practice in Malaysia meets the objectives of the RUS. It is important to 
examine closely the RUS since this is often the choice adopted by vulnerable accused at trial. 
My dissertation reveals that the current characteristics of the RUS in Malaysia make it 
ineffective as protection to vulnerable accused. This chapter also highlights why the RUS is 
problematic and possible solutions to overcome the problem.  
In Part A, I explain the original aim of the RUS in the criminal justice system. However, it is 
no longer seen as necessary to maintain it in other jurisdictions and therefore has been 
discarded in the legislation of those jurisdictions. Then, I highlight the reasons the Malaysian 
government decided to retain the RUS in the Code. In Part B, I demonstrate that no proper 
research was carried out before making the decision to retain the RUS. I submit that the 
reasons given for the preservation of the RUS are without proper justifications. Furthermore, 
the current features of the RUS in Malaysia are out-dated and open to abuse. It benefits 
neither the vulnerable accused, nor other parties in the criminal trial. Therefore, in Part C, I 
argue that the RUS is problematic and discuss its effects on the court, prosecution and the 
witnesses. In Part D, I analyse the effect on vulnerable accused specifically, and on society 
generally, of the abolition of the RUS. I find that the abolition of the RUS in Malaysia might 
not be practical. However, I discuss current features of the RUS that are in need of 
modification. For this purpose, I discuss how unsworn evidence is used in other jurisdictions 
and how such practices might help to improve the RUS in Malaysia. In Part E, I propose 
some modifications to the RUS to restrict its application to vulnerable accused only. I 
consider some useful characteristics of unsworn evidence. However, I propose the restriction 
against cross-examination be sustained. I argue that a modified unsworn statement may be 
useful for those vulnerable accused who choose to give a statement without an oath in court. 
To give this effect, the Malaysian Evidence Act 1950 needs to be amended. 
 
A The Right to Give an Unsworn Statement 
 
The RUS is an ancient right. In the nineteenth century, accused persons were not allowed to 
give evidence on oath as they were considered to be incompetent as witnesses.
32
 In addition, 
they were not permitted legal representation, except in misdemeanour cases.
33
 This rule was 
                                                          
32
Wayne T Westling ―Anglo-Australian Criminal Procedure the Right of Silence‖ (1975) 7 Tex Tech L Rev 1 at 
1. 
33S Augustine Paul ―Dock Statement – Reality or Myth‖ (1991) 2 CLJ xli at 1 of the electronic version (no 
hardcopy available). 
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originally developed in civil cases in the sixteenth century based on the principle of 
―disqualification for interest.‖34 However, by the end of the seventeenth century, the principle 
was extended to criminal cases since there was a concern that the person who had the greatest 
interest in the charge was the accused.
35
 
In order to avoid miscarriages of justice and to give an opportunity to the accused to respond 
to the prosecution‘s case, the RUS was introduced in England in the late nineteenth century.36 
The RUS has a special characteristic whereby accused are not cross-examined on the 
statements made in their defence. The rationale for the introduction of unsworn statements 
was the protection of accused persons who were thought to be ignorant, illiterate and/or 
innocent because there was a fear that forcing them into the witness box might expose them 
to the unwitting making of self-incriminatory statements.
37
 Hence, it was introduced to 
prevent the accused from facing the challenge of cross-examination.
38
 The RUS was 
exercised by either giving oral statements or by preparing a written statement which would 
later be read before the jury.
39
 
However, the (English) Criminal Law Revision Committee in its Eleventh Report 
recommended that the unsworn statement should be abolished for the reason that if the 
accused chose to give evidence in court, it had to be done under oath and subject to cross-
examination like other witnesses.
40
 There was a concern that allowing the accused to be 
shielded against cross-examination would encourage the accused to give irrelevant statements 
without fear of being questioned by the prosecution. The recommendation was later endorsed 
by the Royal Commission
41
 and the right was abolished in its country of origin in 1982.
42
 
Meanwhile, in New Zealand, the RUS was abolished in 1966.
43
 New Zealand was the first 
Commonwealth country that took the step to depart from the practice of allowing the accused 
to give an unsworn statement.
44
 Now, accused persons who choose to give evidence in court 
have to do it in the same manner as a witness and are subject to cross-examination.
45
 
Hammond J in R v K made it clear that witnesses must deliver their statements on oath, and if 
accused persons choose to give statements in court, then they will be called as witnesses and 
                                                          
34
 Timothy P O‘Neil ―Vindicating the Defendant‘s Constitutional Right to Testify at a Criminal Trial: The Need 
for an On-The-Record Waiver‖ (1989) 51 U Pitt L Rev 809 at 812. 
35K H Marks ―‗Thinking Up‘ about the Right of Silence and Unsworn Statements‖ [1984] LIJ 360 at 371. 
36
Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (E&W), s 1(h). 
37
 C R Williams ―Silence and the Unsworn Statement: An Accused‘s Alternatives To Giving Sworn Evidence‖ 
(1976) 10 Melb U L Rev 481 at 503. 
38
Williams, above n 37, at 494. 
39
At 497. 
40
 (English) Criminal Law Revision Committee, Eleventh Report Evidence (Command Paper No.4991, 1972) at 
[104]. 
41
 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (Command Paper No. 8092, 1981) at [4.67] 
42
Criminal Justice Act1982 (E&W), s 72. 
43
Crimes Amendment Act 1966 (1966 No 98)(NZ), s 5(1); Summary Proceedings Amendment Act 1973(NZ), s 
3. 
44
 Crimes Act 1961(NZ), s 366A; R A McGechan Garrow and McGechan’s Principles of the Law of Evidence 
(7
th
ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1984) at 246. 
45
Chris Gallavin Evidence (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2008) at [4.3]. 
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can be cross-examined by the prosecution.
46
 In addition, the RUS was increasingly seen as 
irrelevant once the ability to give a sworn statement became available to the accused.
47
 
The RUS has been abolished in Australian states in stages despite some controversy;
48
 there 
were diverse views on the retention or abolition of the RUS. However, in some jurisdictions 
in Australia, there has been tendency to replace the unsworn statement with the right to give 
unsworn evidence.
49
 Although some of the characteristics of the unsworn evidence are more 
or less the same as the unsworn statement, the former may be exercised only with the 
permission of the court and cross-examination is allowed. Meanwhile, no such permission is 
needed for unsworn statements. 
Singapore, whose system is very similar to Malaysia, decided to adopt the recommendation 
by the (English) Criminal Law Revision Committee and the RUS was abolished in its 
Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act 1976.
 50
 Now, if the accused elects to give a 
statement, it must be made on oath.
51
 
While other jurisdictions decided that the RUS was anachronistic,
52
 the Malaysian 
government decided otherwise and has safeguarded the RUS in the statute by amending the 
Code to that effect. The discussion in this Part begins with analysis of the Select Committee 
Report (hereinafter referred to as ―the Committee Report‖) concerning the amendment to s 
173 (ha) of the Code. I examine the reasons behind the decision to give the RUS statutory 
effect. It is apparent that the amendment was intended to give clarity on the options available 
to accused at the defence stage. However, the Committee Report also revealed that there was 
a proposal by the Select Committee of the House of Representatives (hereinafter referred to 
as ―the Committee‖) to allow cross-examination on an unsworn statement when it is based on 
s 113 of the Code. However, the proposal received strong objection from the public.  
 
                                                          
46
R v K [1995] 2 NZLR 440 at 447. 
47
(15 June 1966) 346 NZPD 490. 
48
 Law Reform Commission Criminal Procedure: Unsworn Statements of Accused Persons (NSWLRC R45, 
1985) at [3.10]; Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 31; Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 18A; Criminal Code of 
Queensland, s 618 (former statute); Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 97; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), s 30A; Marks, 
above n 35, at 372. 
49
 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 13;Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 13; Evidence Act 2011(ACT), s 13; Evidence 
Act 2001(Tas), s 13; Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), s 13; Evidence Act 1929(SA), s 9; Evidence Act 1977(Qld), s 
9A; Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 106C; Criminal Code (NT), s 360; Law Reform Criminal Law and Procedure 
Australia-Victoria (1986) 12 CLB 446 at 468; James Gobbo, Governor of Victoria ―The Legal Profession in 
Victoria – Idealism under Stress‖ (Leo Cussen Memorial Lecture 2000, Leo Cussen Institute, Victoria, 18 
October 2000); Law Reform Commission The Right to Silence, (NSWLRC R95, 2000) at [4.71]; David Brown 
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Particularly in New South Wales) and the Civil Law System in France‖ (2003) 26 UNSWLJ 515 at 526. 
50
 Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act 1976(Malaysia). 
51Criminal Procedure Code 2010(Singapore), s 291; Stanley Yeo Meng Heong ―My Lord, the Defendant 
Chooses to Remain Silent‖ (1981) 23 Malaya L Rev 237 at 238. 
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 C L D Meares ―Judges Support Removal of Dock Statement‖ The Sydney Morning Herald (online ed, 
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Therefore, in Section 2, I discuss the connection between the statement under s 113 and the 
unsworn statement. I argue that to maintain the RUS based on those reasons is groundless. In 
Section 3, I also argue that public opinion received during the process of drafting legislation 
is crucial but should be assessed carefully.  
 
1 Why Malaysia sustains the right to give an unsworn statement 
 
The RUS in Malaysia was a substantive right prior to the year 2007. It adopted the English 
criminal procedure on the issue by invoking s 5 of the Code to justify the application of the 
RUS in the Malaysian criminal trial. However, the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) 
2004 Bill was tabled in the House of Representatives on 12 July 2006, and one of the 
proposed amendments was to incorporate a specific clause concerning the RUS.
53
 The 
Committee had conducted surveys involving 67 organisations and associations, consisting of 
representations from human rights pressure groups such as SUHAKAM, SUARAM (‗Suara 
Rakyat Malaysia‘, the Voice of the Malaysian People), Police Watch and the Joint Action 
Group-Violence Against Women, as well as from the Attorney-General, the Deputy Police 
Chief, the Chief Registrar of the Federal Court, and representatives from the Malaysian 
Lawyers Association, the Prison Service, and from local universities.
54
 The committee also 
visited Australia and New Zealand for the purpose of the amendments, and legislation in 
Singapore, New Zealand and Australia was referred to explicitly in respect of amending s 
173.
55
 
Before analysing the amendment on the RUS in the Code, the Committee Report as delivered 
in Parliament by the then Minister of Justice, Mohd Radzi bin Sheikh Ahmad, must be 
examined. The Committee Report in its original language states:
56
 
Tuan Yang di-Pertua, pindaan kepada perenggan 173(h)(a) bertujuan memperuntukkan 
secara khusus tiga pilihan pembelaan kepada tertuduh iaitu samaada beliau hendak memberi 
keterangan bersumpah dari kandang saksi, memberi keterangan dari kandang tertuduh atau 
berdiam diri. Cadangan pindaan asal juga memperuntukkan bahawa jika tertuduh memilih 
untuk memberi pernyataan secara tidak bersumpah dari kandang tertuduh dan pembelaannya 
berkaitan dengan pernyataan beramaran yang merupakan sebahagian daripada keterangan 
pendakwaan, beliau boleh diperiksabalas oleh pendakwa. 
Orang ramai membantah dengan keras cadangan pindaan yang membolehkan pendakwaan 
menyoalbalas tertuduh mengenai pemberian pernyataan secara tidak bersumpah dari 
kandang tertuduh jika pembelaannya menyentuh pernyataan beramarannya yang telah 
                                                          
53
 (13 July 2006) 46 MPD HR at 39; Criminal Procedure Code (Malaysia), s 173(ha). 
54
Farrar, above n 3, at 135. 
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menjadi sebahagian daripada kes pendakwaan. Mereka menghujahkan bahawa prosedur ini 
adalah bertentangan dengan undang-undang yang sedia ada.  
Jawatankuasa setelah mempertimbangkan maklumbalas serta kedudukan undang-undang 
bersetuju dengan pendapat orang ramai bahawa adalah tidak adil untuk membenarkan pihak 
pendakwaan memeriksabalas tertuduh mengenai pemberian pernyataan tidak bersumpah. 
Sehubungan itu jawatankuasa mencadangkan peruntukan ini dimansuhkan. Ini adalah 
selaras dengan pindaan seksyen 113 yang telah dijelaskan sebelum ini. 
Translation: 
Mr Speaker, the amendment to paragraph 173 (h) (a) specifically seeks to provide three 
options of defence to the accused person that are whether he or she wants to give a sworn 
statement from the witness‘s box, to testify from the dock or remain silent. The original 
proposed amendment also provides that if the accused person chooses to give an unsworn 
statement from the dock and his or her defence is related to the cautioned statement that has 
become part of the prosecution's evidence, he or she may be cross-examined by the 
prosecutor. 
The public strongly objected to the amendment that allows the accused to be cross-examined 
by the prosecution on the unsworn statement from the dock if his or her defence is in relation 
to the cautioned statement that has been part of the prosecution case. They argued that this 
procedure is contrary to the existing law. 
After considering the feedback and the position of the law, the committee agreed with the 
public opinion that it is unfair to allow the prosecution to cross-examine the accused on the 
unsworn statement. Therefore the committee recommends for this provision to be repealed. 
This is in line with the amendment to section 113 that has been explained before. 
Apparently, the purpose behind inserting s 173(ha) in the Code was to improve clarity 
regarding the three choices an accused person has when the defence case is called: to give a 
sworn statement from the witness box; to make an unsworn statement from the dock; or to 
remain silent. However, there was remarkably little discussion concerning the RUS in the 
Committee Report. The only discussion on this issue is found in clause 14 of the Committee 
Report in respect of the amendment to s 113 in regard to the admissibility of a cautioned 
statement. The amendment to s 113(which now in force) provides guidelines on how to use 
any statements that were made in the course of a police investigation in court.
57
 The 
subsection in s 113 that is relevant to s 173 is:
58
 
S 113 
(1) ……… 
(2) ……… 
                                                          
57
At 33. 
58
At 33. 
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(3) Where the accused had made a statement during the course of a police investigation such 
statement may be admitted in evidence in support of his defence during the course of the 
trial. 
(4) ……… 
(5) ………  
 
As can be seen from the Committee report extract set out above, because of public objection 
to cross-examination on an unsworn statement, no amendment to the practice of giving an 
unsworn statement was in fact made.  
2 The relationship between the amendment of s 113 and s 173(ha) of the Malaysian 
criminal procedure code 
 
Before the amendment to s 113, the prosecution used cautioned statements (statements made 
by the accused during police investigations that may be used against him or her at trial) under 
the former s 113 of the Code as evidence in court. However, after scrutinising feedback from 
the Police Department, the Attorney-General‘s Chambers, Bar Council, different associations 
and the public, the Committee was of the view that an amendment should be made to repeal 
the ability of the prosecution to adduce cautioned statements in court. This is because most of 
the time cautioned statements are inadmissible in court and this situation would undermine 
the police‘s image.59 Besides that, the procedure to adduce cautioned statements in court is 
time consuming, as it may need to go through the process of voir dire.
60
 
These are valid justifications for repealing the ability to adduce cautioned statements, and J D 
Heydon discussed similar drawbacks regarding confessions in police custody.
61
 According to 
Heydon, besides taking time and money, a voir dire process could disrupt the main trial. In 
addition, the tendency of the accused to allege police misdemeanours during confession 
taking would affect the police‘s reputation.62 Furthermore, a confession made voluntarily 
would still be considered unfair if it were admitted in court.
63 
However, such an explanation 
does not absolve the Committee from any controversy regarding the decision. The question 
arises as to what existing law the public was referring to, as referred to by the Committee in 
the Committee Report. If the law is s 113 itself, it is evident from the construction of the 
proposed amendment that the section does not explicitly indicate that the accused should not 
be cross-examined if he or she chooses to use the statement in s 113(3). Even if the public 
was referring to the Code, it has to be borne in mind that the RUS was merely a practice 
rather than a statutory right at the time. However, there may be a possibility that the basic 
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 J D Heydon ―Current Trends in the Law of Evidence‖ (1977) 8 Syd L Rev 305. 
62
 At 310; Wendy Amigo ―Uncorroborated Confessions: Recent Decisions in the New South Wales Court of 
Criminal Appeal‖ (1979) 3 UNSWLJ 321 at 321-322. 
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rights of an accused person, as guaranteed by the Malaysian Federal Constitution, were 
referred to.
64
 The rights of an accused person in the Constitution are clearly set out  in the 
Code and s 173(ha) concerns one of those rights. That said, there is no specific explanation in 
the Constitution to suggest that cross-examination of an accused person at trial could deprive 
them of their personal liberty or deny fair treatment. It is undeniable that an accused person 
deserves to be treated fairly by the law. However, it is not necessarily the case that cross-
examination is detrimental to all accused. It may be argued that in the absence of a clear 
discussion in the Committee‘s report as to what the ―existing law‖ referred to was, this issue 
remains a mystery. Hence, the vagueness on these aspects opens up the Committee‘s Report 
to criticism. 
 
As discussed, one of the main factors in the retention of the RUS was the objection of the 
public to its abolition. The next part will discuss public perceptions of fairness and the extent 
to which the public should influence the enactment of a law. 
3 Public interest and the law 
 
The Committee stated that it would be unfair to the accused if he or she was allowed to be 
cross-examined. The word ―unfair‖ used in the report is also controversial, as the report does 
not explain how this could be unfair to the accused. 
The rights of an accused person in court are protected under the principle of a fair trial. 
However, this principle also involves an element of public interest. It may be submitted that 
the public interest has no direct interpretation. Although the public interest should be taken 
into account in upholding justice, fairness to the accused may also be interpreted as serving 
justice to society. This is because society may not tolerate a system that serves one-sided 
justice. It could be argued that forcing the accused to be cross-examined on an unsworn 
statement may be seen as injustice by the public, since such action may affect disadvantaged 
or vulnerable accused. One of the main reasons an accused might choose to give an unworn 
statement in court is because he or she has limited ability to cope with the processes of the 
court, which may be intimidating for them. This particularly affects accused with intellectual 
disabilities. To force this class of accused to go through cross-examination may cause them to 
damage their own case. Hence, protection against cross-examination is one of the ways to 
assist this type of accused in facing the challenge of court proceedings. This might be why 
the public objected to the Committee‘s proposal to cross-examine the accused on statements 
made from the dock. However, whether or not this is the reason that persuaded the public to 
object is not obvious from the Committee Report. To maintain the RUS with the aim to avoid 
an accused person from being cross-examined by the prosecution, particularly without some 
limitation on the application of the RUS, may backfire. Such leeway may cause the RUS to 
be taken advantage of by those accused that do not deserve such protection. After all, the 
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initial objective of the RUS when it was introduced was to protect ―ignorant‖ accused. The 
intention of the RUS suggests that it should not be allowed to be used generally now that 
legal representation and general improvements in education are in place, but that it should be 
narrowed down to the vulnerable accused only.  
Should the public have such a direct effect on criminal justice policy? On the one hand, it is 
argued that the public may not be well versed on what constitutes good procedure. Linda J 
Skitka and David A Houston found in their empirical analysis that when the public do not 
know whether an accused is guilty or not, they will observe the outcome of the proceeding as 
legitimate when it involves fair procedures and the accused is shielded with due process 
rules.
65
 On the other hand, if the public is using its moral mandate (―the selective expression 
of a core moral value or values‖)66 in determining the outcome of the case, it is shown that 
procedural fairness is no longer necessary, as the public is then more interested in the fairness 
of the trial verdict.
67
 This study is a perfect example of how the public may perceive fairness 
differently according to the situation and its level of knowledge.  
Regardless of how the public perceives fairness in a trial procedure, it is submitted that its 
opinion is still crucial.
68
 This is because, theoretically at least, laws that take into account 
public opinion are good laws. However, although the public‘s opinion is pivotal in 
determining a law, it is submitted that the legislator as the law maker should consider the 
issues or opinions from every aspect to formulate effective solutions. To take on board public 
opinion without thorough research may produce a senseless law. People come from different 
educational and cultural backgrounds. It is impossible to please everyone as each person has 
a different perspective on things. Therefore, public perception is not the only factor to be 
considered in passing a law. It is a challenge to establish a procedure that will satisfy all 
parties in a criminal trial. However, it is the duty of the government to provide fair 
procedures that take into account both the interest of the public and the interest of the 
accused, and come to some assessment of what is required in light of sometimes competing 
demands. The ability to produce such procedures will ensure a fairer justice system as 
required by the principle of a fair trial. It is my contention that, in relation to vulnerable 
accused, this does not happen in the Malaysian justice system. In the following discussion, I 
contend that the decision to give statutory effect to the RUS was made without adequate 
research.  
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B Whether Appropriate Research was Conducted Prior to the Amendment to s 173(ha)  
 
It is my view that the government‘s justification for keeping the unsworn statement is without 
rigour. The decision to keep and codify the RUS followed a decided lack of analytical study 
or discussion. Instead of focusing on the main issue – whether the RUS is still relevant in 
Malaysia – the Committee was more concerned with cross-examination on statements in s 
113. It is somewhat surprising to realise that the disadvantages laid down to justify the 
amendment of s 113 are in fact present in relation to unsworn statements, as the RUS could 
also be time consuming and the issue of admissibility of the statement is always questioned. 
Nevertheless, the Committee did not seem to recognise such similarity. The Committee failed 
to consider the fact that the unsworn statement itself has flaws that require a review. The 
Committee was able to research the issue of admission of statement made during a police 
investigation that is consistent with recent developments in other countries, but unfortunately 
no attempt was made to evaluate the viability of the unsworn statement today, despite the 
obvious disadvantages, as discussed below in Part C, of continuing to allow the unsworn 
statement in its present form.  
It is submitted that as many concerns were voiced in respect of suspects‘ rights pre-trial, the 
same attention should also be given to the accused‘s rights available during trial. This could 
have been the perfect opportunity for thorough research to be done in respect of this issue as 
the Committee visited Australia and New Zealand, which have long abandoned the RUS. 
They could have capitalised on the opportunity afforded by the visits to ensure that all related 
aspects of the law that required attention were taken into consideration. Unfortunately, the 
focus of the amendment was more on the rights of the accused pre-trial and, as clearly seen in 
the Committee Report, the visits to New Zealand and Australia were more directed towards 
the rights of accused persons while in police custody. While it is defendable that the 
Committee had pre-trial rights as its main focus, given that a number of controversial issues 
had occurred in Malaysia and public confidence regarding protection of suspects‘ rights was 
decreasing due to the treatment of suspects by the police during investigation,
69
 it would have 
taken little effort to use the opportunity to also discuss relevant trial rights. 
Furthermore, the discussion on unsworn statements in the Committee Report specifically 
mentioned objections to cross-examination if the accused is relying on a statement made 
during police investigation under s 113. The question that arises is, would the public object if 
cross-examination was made on the unsworn statement made in court, as well as any 
statements made during the investigation? I submit that the answer to this question required 
in-depth research by the Committee.  On the surface, the decision to maintain the RUS is 
unreasonable. I submit that there are other relevant factors that make it justifiable for the 
unsworn statement to remain in the Malaysian justice system that the Committee has failed to 
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notice. One of the most relevant reasons is to protect vulnerable accused. However, the 
Committee did not discuss this. Therefore, there is a legitimate assumption that the unsworn 
statement is preserved for the benefit of all accused. This is where the RUS becomes 
irrelevant in Malaysia. 
If efforts had been made to discuss the rights of accused persons during trial with the relevant 
authorities in New Zealand and Australia, there is a possibility that the Committee would 
have considered more fully whether it is reasonable to preserve the accused‘s right to give an 
unsworn statement. Perhaps an examination would have then been made on whether to 
maintain, modify or abolish the RUS in the future. The amendment in 2007 chose to 
consolidate the RUS, but the Committee‘s deliberations could also have been the road to 
discarding it if evidence suggested that was the best course. It seems that the RUS could be 
taken away only by an express provision in the Code. This observation is found in the 
Singapore case of Mohamed Salleh v PP where  Wee Chong Jin CJ decided that:
70
 
 
In our judgment, the right of an accused at his trial on a criminal charge to make an unsworn 
statement from the dock is not a procedural right but a substantive right of an accused and 
accordingly does not depend on whether or not there is a specific provision for it in the 
Criminal Procedure Code. It seems to us beyond doubt that under our system of 
administration of justice, and it has been so throughout the entire history of our courts, a 
person accused of a criminal offence before an established court of justice has at his trial, as 
part of his defence, the right to make an unsworn statement from the dock if he wishes to do 
so. In our view this right can be taken away only by an express statutory provision to 
that effect (Emphasis added). 
Since the judgment has never been refuted by a court of concurrent jurisdiction in Malaysia, 
and in fact has been followed by succeeding cases, it is submitted that legislative abolition is 
the only legitimate way to remove the RUS. 
My dissertation argues that if the Malaysian criminal justice system could produce a better 
justice system, it might benefit not only the public as a whole, but also help the government 
to gain the confidence of the people. For this to happen, parliament needs to be more 
effective and open-minded in order to change law that is out-dated in the current legal world 
and replace it with law that serves justice for all parties involved in criminal proceedings in 
Malaysia. Being an independent country, Malaysia should be free from colonial influence 
physically and mentally. Apparently the remnants of the common law are strongly visible 
only to the mind of parliament, as such influence is losing its place in the hearts of Malaysian 
judges.
71
 It is argued that such an anomaly in law making may be avoided if judges‘ views 
are appreciated and considered by the legislature before any laws are enacted or amended. A 
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relevant case to illustrate the court‘s view on the English law is seen in the case of Public 
Prosecutor v Sanassi where Sharma J held: 
72
 
It is entirely a matter for the legislature to decide whether the procedure of the courts in this 
country, which is now sovereign and independent, should depend upon a foreign enactment 
and whether any amendment made to its own laws by a foreign Government should still 
continue to remain binding on us who have a supreme legislature of our own. 
Malaysia should learn from the other Commonwealth countries, and one good example is 
Singapore. Singapore has decided to amend legislation that emerges from the practice and 
procedures of the English laws.
73
 It is argued that if Malaysia thought that the jury system 
was no longer relevant to its justice system, and eventually abolished it in 1995, why are 
there no similar moves taken to review English laws that may no longer be relevant to current 
practice in Malaysia? Even worse, Malaysia continues to practice law that is no longer in 
existence in England. It is not wrong to have reliance on the law and procedure in England as 
long as it suits the community. It is time for the Malaysian government to rethink the English 
law that is no longer relevant to the current situation. The amendment to the Code in 2007 
was made without proper research and consideration and it allows the longstanding 
controversy regarding the RUS to continue. This is a great disappointment, since the 
amendments that were made were the biggest changes in the Malaysian Criminal Procedure 
Code for more than 30 years.
74
 However, as the reverse happened and the RUS was 
confirmed in statute by its inclusion in the amended Code, my dissertation explores the 
possible problems it causes to the Malaysian criminal justice. In the next part, I analyse the 
impact on the court, the prosecution and witnesses of maintaining the RUS with its current 
features.  
 
C The Right to give an Unsworn Statement in the Malaysian Criminal Justice System 
Today is Problematic 
 
I argue that before any legislation is amended, it is essential to consider the effects of every 
aspect of the laws in order to create rational and acceptable rules. The opinions and 
conditions of all parties directly affected by the amendment have to be seriously taken into 
consideration to ensure that the legislation will provide reasonable consequences and promote 
fairness to all participants. This is because everyone ―is a potential prisoner, and anyone is a 
potential victim of crime.‖75 Besides, it is also crucial to ensure that all the money and time 
allocated in the enactment of the laws are not expended in vain. As it stands now, the RUS 
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without proper guidelines and limitation might raise the issue of the inequality of arms 
between an accused and the state. This happens due to the nature of the RUS, which is 
applicable to all accused from any background, without limiting it to those who are 
vulnerable. An accused who does not have special need for protection could take advantage 
of the RUS. Therefore, to make sure that the Code was amended after due consideration, the 
impact of the amendment on the relevant parties – that is, the court, the prosecution and the 
witnesses – will be assessed.  
This Part discusses the consequence of the current practice of the RUS in criminal 
proceedings, beginning with the court. I argue in Section 1 that the RUS does not receive 
popular support from the judges, particularly when its evidential status is uncertain. It is 
obvious in this section that it is a waste of judicial time to exercise a right that is freely 
adopted but often not accepted as evidence by the court. In Section 2, I discuss the effect of 
the RUS in terms of the prosecution. Allowing an accused who does not need protection 
against cross-examination to enjoy the benefit of the RUS is unfair to the prosecution. The 
prosecution does not have the opportunity to verify the statement and this is a major 
disadvantage to the prosecution‘s case. Finally, in Section 3, I discuss the impact of the RUS 
on witnesses. The characteristic of the RUS that allows the accused to attack a witness‘s 
character while his or her character remains safe, has a very detrimental effect, especially in a 
sensitive case such as rape. I argue that if this situation persists, it may prevent the witness 
from coming forward and assisting the state to solve crime in the future. 
1 Court 
 
Prior to the abolition of the RUS in other jurisdictions, it was a controversial practice.
76
 In 
Australia, a Supreme Court judge, Acting Justice Lee, suggested that the law should be 
changed and he added that allowing the accused person to make an unsworn statement 
amounted to ―conscious and deliberate manipulation of the trial process‖ that would 
contribute to the delaying of trials and cost society a huge financial burden.
77
 
The issue of the RUS is not widely researched in Malaysia. However, the opinions of judges 
on this issue are not to be taken lightly. Although use of the unsworn statement has been 
followed by judges in Malaysia, it may be argued that judges do not wholeheartedly agree 
with the RUS. Careful examination of judgments illustrates that judges in Malaysia have been 
trying to channel their views and observations on the RUS to the government through those 
judgments. It is fair to say that judges tend towards abolition rather than maintenance of the 
RUS, as evident from their judgments.
78
 Unfortunately, the efforts of the judges have gone 
unnoticed by the government. One of the best examples to represent the view of judges on 
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unsworn statements can be seen in the case of Public Prosecutor v Shariff Kadir where 
Hishamudin Yunus J, in referring to the abolition of the right in England, was of the opinion 
that:
79
 
With all humility, I respectfully suggest that perhaps our Parliament might consider making a 
similar move. In my humble view, besides the theoretical legal difficulties inherent in such a 
practice (of allowing unsworn statement to be made by an accused), as I have endeavoured to 
point out, such a practice also appears to be somewhat inconsistent with the scheme of the 
Criminal Procedure Code.  
However, be that as it may, as for the moment, the reception of unsworn statements from the 
dock is still part and parcel of the law of this country and it is my solemn duty as a judge to 
apply the law as it is – no matter what my personal views are on the matter.  
The RUS creates a nuisance in the criminal court system. This is due to the characteristics of 
the RUS which, amongst others, include the fact that the statement may contain hearsay 
evidence and irrelevant statements, shields the accused from cross-examination by the 
prosecution, and fails to test the truthfulness of the statements.
80
 In Australia, the accused is 
not permitted to give statements that are not relevant to the case.
81
 For example, in the case of 
R v Kilby, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal held that ―a prisoner has not the 
right to make a statement from the dock which is not relevant to any issue in the case being 
tried.‖82 However, a different approach may be seen in Malaysian courts, where the court 
may not interrupt the accused in the course of making an unsworn statement unless it is to 
make clear an ambiguity in the statement.
83
 One of the best examples of how irrelevant 
unsworn statements can be, without the courts having the power to prevent it, is found in the 
unreported case of Public Prosecutor v Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim.84 The accused in this case 
was the former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, who was charged with sodomy under s 
377B of the Malaysian Penal Code. At the defence stage, the accused chose to give an 
unsworn statement from the dock. He contended that the charge was a conspiracy of the 
Malaysian Prime Minister and with malicious intent to send him to prison.
85
 Although the 
statements were irrelevant to the charge, the High Court judge was unable to stop it and 
instead had to spend his judicial time to hear the same.  
The grey area about the evidential status of the RUS may also be one of the key factors why 
judges are not keen to retain the RUS. Not only are there different views by judges and legal 
scholars about the RUS‘s evidential status, it is also seen as an unnecessary practice that is 
problematic for judges, as they are given the burden of determining whether the statements 
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are admissible or not.
86
 The evidential status of the unsworn statement is discussed in more 
detail next. 
(a) The evidential status of unsworn statements  
 
Although the issue of unsworn statements is not extensively explored by legal academics in 
Malaysia, the main scholarly arguments focus on the evidential status of the unsworn 
statement.
87
 At the moment, the evidential status of the RUS is unclear and creates tension 
amongst Malaysian legal scholars and the judiciary. Nevertheless, it is an acceptable principle 
that an unsworn statement has little evidential value when compared to sworn testimony.
88
  
The Code was amended to make the position of the RUS in s 173(ha) clearer and it is now a 
procedural right rather than a substantive right, but the law in Malaysia fails to explain the 
status of the statement.
89
 Previous studies reinforce the view that the evidential status of 
unsworn statement is blurred, as such studies were not able to give a clear answer on the 
exact position of unsworn statement in the law of evidence. This is the case particularly with 
regard to the term ―evidence‖ in s 3, since it is unclear whether a statement from the dock is 
considered as evidence under the provision. According to Mohd Akram b Shair Mohamad, 
the term ―evidence‖ and ―proved‖ in s 3 have to be read together in order to determine the 
meaning of evidence.
90
 He argues that the parliament intentionally omitted the word evidence 
in interpreting the term ―proved‖ and used the words ―matters before it‖ instead so that the 
unsworn statement could fall under the wording of ―matters before it‖ as used under the 
definition of ―proved‖.91 Therefore, an unsworn statement does not necessarily fall under the 
definition of ―evidence‖ but it fits into the phrase ―proved‖ in s 3.92 This means that although 
an unsworn statement is not evidence in its direct meaning, it is still a matter for the court to 
consider in determining whether a particular fact is proved or not.
93
 Although this argument 
sounds convincing at a glance, on careful review, it is submitted that it is merely taking 
advantage of the ambiguous meaning of the term ―matter before it‖. This happens in order to 
provide legitimacy to unsworn statements in the law of evidence. As bare statutory 
interpretation allows for a far from definitive conclusion about the evidential status of 
unsworn statements, relevant case law must be assessed.  
In the case of Ng Hoi Cheu v Public Prosecutor, Chan Min Tat J held although the accused 
gives an unsworn statement from the dock, such a statement falls under the definition of 
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evidence in s 3 of the Evidence Ordinance.
94
 In a later case of Public Prosecutor v Sanassi, 
Sharma J disagreed with Chan Min Tat J and held that an unsworn statement is not 
evidence.
95
 In Mohamed Salleh v Public Prosecutor, the Federal Court held that the accused 
was allowed under the law to give a statement from the dock and the jury should evaluate the 
statement with the weight that they considered fit.
96
 The wish to retain flexibility to assess the 
statement in the light of the particular facts and other evidence in the case is understandable. 
However, the approach is rather unhelpful for fact-finders in later cases. I submit that the 
principle laid down in Mohamed Salleh’s case relied heavily on the principle regarding 
unsworn statements in English cases. It concerns only the matter of how to warn the jury and 
what would be the proper comment to be made to the jury regarding the weight of the 
unsworn statement. The court neither discussed thoroughly whether the unsworn statement 
falls under the category of evidence or not, nor did it give clear guidelines regarding the 
evidential weight to accord an unsworn statement. Since Mohamed Salleh has become the 
leading case on this issue, the ambiguity remains.  
Given the fact that criminal trial in Malaysia is now by judge alone, the principle in 
Mohamed Salleh‘s case may no longer be much help to the judges in making their findings 
regarding the evidential status of an unsworn statement. Before 2007, the responsibility on 
the judges to consider the weight of the unsworn statement as they thought proper might have 
been an acceptable approach, since making an unsworn statement was a substantive right that 
was uncodified. Now, as the RUS has become a codified procedural right, the status of the 
statement should be made clear in the statute, as it has been given recognition by the law. For 
example, it should be made clear whether the evidential value of an unsworn statement 
carries the same value as, or lesser value than, evidence given on oath. Unfortunately, the 
silence of the Code on the matter of the evidential status of unsworn statements means that 
judges must decide. If the objective of the RUS is to provide a protection to the accused 
during trial, it should not make a negative implication to them. If the unsworn statement has 
not got the status of evidence then there would be a likelihood that the statement would not 
affect the court‘s decision. However, being a superior court, the principle in Mohamad 
Salleh’s case is not fully ignored by later cases and its finding is authoritative. Therefore, 
until the evidential status of unsworn statements is made clear, arguments on the weight of 
such statements are likely to persist.  
A further disadvantage offered by the RUS to the court is that it causes delay in the 
proceeding. Even though some may argue that a dock statement is shorter than sworn 
evidence,
97
 such a view may be refuted by reference to the speech by His Excellency the 
Honourable Sir James Gobbo. He explained that among the reasons for the abolition of the 
unsworn statement in Victoria, Australia, was a case where the accused persons had made an 
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unsworn statement for fourteen days.
98
 He also added that Mr Stonehouse, former British 
Cabinet Minister in the United Kingdom, gave an unsworn statement for five days.
99
  
2 Prosecution 
 
It is disappointing to know that the Attorney-General was one of the parties actively involved 
in the amendment of the Code, but that as yet there is no initiative to suggest reform in 
respect of the unsworn statement considering the problems it causes the prosecution. It may 
be argued that one possible reason this is happening is that the prosecution may think that the 
RUS does not threaten its case due to its low evidential value. However, it has been shown 
that even though the issue of the evidential status of the unsworn statement remains unclear, 
there is nothing to stop judges from exercising discretion in admitting and considering the 
statement in their decisions. Attention should be paid to the case of Er Ah Kiat v Public 
Prosecutor.
100
 Wylie CJ in his judgment stated that the unsworn statement made by the 
accused should be taken into account by the court of first instance as that statement formed 
part of his defence.
101
 Therefore, failure to do that caused the conviction to be set aside by the 
Federal Court and a retrial was ordered.
102
 The decision of the Federal Court on the issue of 
admissibility of the unsworn statement in this case should not be taken lightly, for the 
decision came from the highest court of the land. 
The prosecutor plays a ―less partisan role‖ than the defence counsel since it is not the duty of 
the prosecution to secure a conviction but rather to present the case in a fair manner.
103
 
However, disallowing the prosecution to cross-examine the accused may frustrate the aim of 
the criminal process to deliver justice by disadvantaging the prosecution to test evidence 
contrary to their case. It must be borne in mind that ―the purpose of cross-examination is to 
weaken, qualify, or destroy the case of the opponent and to establish the party‘s own case by 
the opponent‘s witnesses.‖104 No doubt there could be valid reasons other than guilt as to why 
accused persons choose not to give evidence that could expose them to cross-examination. 
There may be possibilities that surrendering themselves to cross-examination would cost 
them their private lives or destroy a personal relationship.
105
 Even though the RUS would 
benefit the innocent accused, as they would be able to explain their defence to the court 
without fear of cross-examination, it might also give an advantage to ―a guilty accused who 
fears that his inadequate story will be exposed by cross-examination.‖106 These were amongst 
the reasons taken into account by the English Criminal Law Revision Committee when it 
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recommended abolition of the RUS.
107
 In addition, since the judge has the power to protect 
the accused against harassment in cross-examination, the preservation of the RUS is no 
longer acceptable.
108
 However, the abolition of the unsworn statement in New South Wales 
raised several arguments amongst legal practitioners. It was feared that the move would force 
the accused to give evidence in the court and face cross-examination, which would attack the 
accused‘s right to silence and diminish the ―fundamental obligation of the Crown to prove the 
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.‖109   
It might seem as though the prosecution has more power and resources than accused persons 
as it has the might of the state at its disposal.
110
 However, other mechanisms of due process 
are in place to address the power imbalance, so that:
111
 
While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of 
his defence. He is immune from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted 
when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve.  
In addition, the prosecution has the duty to disclose evidence in advance of the trial so that 
the defence can prepare. Hence, it may be submitted that there are available protections under 
the law to safeguard the due process rights between the state and the accused and other 
jurisdictions have not suffered from a lack of the RUS. If the interests between these two 
parties are well taken care of, then a fair trial could be said to have been achieved. Therefore, 
I submit that the current characteristics of the RUS in Malaysia might create an imbalance of 
treatment between the state and accused persons. This happens because not all accused need 
such protections, due to advances in education and the right to legal representation. In 
addition, judges are bestowed with the discretion to ensure that all parties are treated fairly, 
and there are mechanisms in place to ensure that prosecutors do not treat the accused badly 
during cross-examination, as well as extensive rights of appeal. Hence, to allow any accused 
to give an unsworn statement may have an impact on the fairness of the proceedings. I 
submit, these are some of the reasons why the RUS has become ineffective. However, a 
different situation may be seen in respect of vulnerable accused. They may not gain 
advantage from education nor would having legal counsel do much to assist them.  
3 Witnesses 
 
It is not clear in the Committee Report as to what research had been done in respect of the 
implication of unsworn statement to witnesses. A witness in a criminal trial may be directly 
affected by the RUS in Malaysia because the accused is free to attack the credibility or 
trustworthiness of the prosecution‘s witness but at the same time the former‘s bad character 
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or any previous convictions remains unmentioned.
112
 The witness‘s situation is most difficult 
when it comes to rape cases. Her credibility is at stake, as it is more likely to be attacked by 
the accused or their counsels than is the case in any other types of cases. Undoubtedly, an 
accused person needs greater protections since his or her liberty is in peril, but to allow the 
accused to criticise the witness‘s credibility in the name of the right provided by the law is 
unreasonable.  
The view that an unsworn statement would be able to assist accused who are nervous in court 
fails to consider that the same anxiety may also be experienced by the prosecution‘s 
witness.
113
 There is a fear that this might hinder a witness from coming forward to testify 
against the accused.
114
 This is obviously not the expected outcome of the rule of law, which is 
supposed to facilitate the work of the police and prosecution in upholding justice, besides 
providing fair treatment to the accused. According to the Rt Hon Lord Justice Leveson, not 
only do the witnesses or society have a responsibility to come forward to support the justice 
system, but the justice system also has the same obligation towards society.
115
 Having 
discussed the impacts of the current characteristics of the RUS on the parties in criminal 
proceedings, I now turn to discuss the possible method to solve the situation. 
 
D To Amend or to Abolish: What is the Correct Approach? 
 
The RUS might have been an acceptable practice before, but might no longer be relevant in 
the modern era. Furthermore, the RUS has lost its original purpose. The unsworn statement 
symbolizes an ―anomaly in the administration of criminal justice‖ and the step to abrogate the 
right is ―welcome‖.116 It is worth noting the observation expressed by the Hon. Mr. Justice K 
H Marks of the Supreme Court of Victoria, which explains everything. Referring to the Royal 
Commission, he stated that the RUS should be abolished: 
117
 
Although it is of relatively long standing, its purpose has long since gone. And there are some 
positive objections to it. It provides an opportunity for the accused to engage in attacks on the 
prosecution or upon his co-accused, which cannot be tested in cross-examination. Its status is 
unclear and may be confusing to a jury and Magistrate; since it is not on oath and cannot be 
tested by cross-examination it is not formal evidence. But the jury can scarcely ignore it, and 
have to be instructed merely to make of it what they wish. In our view, this is extremely 
unsatisfactory. 
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Considering the effect of the RUS on other parties in the criminal trial, as discussed in Part C, 
the relevance of the RUS to the modern nature of criminal justice in Malaysia must be 
examined. The perception that the RUS was already seen as unnecessary after the accused 
was allowed to give evidence on oath began in the twentieth century. Such a perception is 
even more pronounced in the twenty-first century. In an English case, R v Pope,  Phillimore J 
was of the view that ―now that the prisoner is entitled to give evidence on his own behalf 
under the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, is not his right to make a statement gone?‖118 The 
same view was also expressed in an article written by Peiris, when he pointed out that now 
the accused is recognised as competent to give evidence on oath, some countries feel that the 
RUS implicitly no longer exists, regardless of the statutes providing otherwise.
119
  
There is no yardstick, in the current law in Malaysia, to determine whether the accused falls 
within the category of ―ignorant and not intellectual or innocent‖. For example, there are 
occasions where an accused who chooses to give an unsworn statement comes from a high 
level of educational background and is therefore literate and able to cope with the court 
competently.
120
 There is also an argument that the court will not be able to determine whether 
the accused suffers from any intellectual disability or is simply nervous because he is guilty, 
when they do poorly in cross-examination.
121
 Therefore, it is argued that the RUS is open to 
abuse, and it appears that some accused persons who are educated and articulate are indeed 
taking advantage of the system.
122
 This was clearly not the intention of the RUS when it was 
introduced. Eventually, the right that was supposedly to be made available to ―ignorant‖ 
accused has now become available to accused from all backgrounds in Malaysia. 
Nevertheless, the views against the abolition of the RUS consider that nervous accused and 
those with a tendency to ―create a poor impression‖ through their demeanour may be at a 
disadvantage if there is no right available in between the RUS and the RRS.
123
  
Today, with more educational opportunities, I submit that the RUS is an anachronism. 
Abolition in Malaysia would bring the system into line with other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions. However, all countries are unique, and a comprehensive analysis needs to be 
done in respect of the background of the society to ensure that the law is suitable for the 
people. This is because an argument could be made that although the unsworn statement has 
been abolished in other jurisdictions, it does not mean that the same move would be as just in 
Malaysia as it might be in those jurisdictions.
124
 Therefore, for this purpose, it is crucial to 
analyse the barriers that may exist in order to determine whether the abolition of the RUS is 
practical or not in Malaysia. The factors that must be examined in discussing this aspect are 
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the culture, language and level of education found in Malaysia, since these could influence 
how the accused will conduct themselves at trial.  
There is a diversity of races in Malaysia: Malay, Chinese and Indian. Regardless of the 
difference, they practise almost the same way of living. The culture of one race is not alien to 
the other. Furthermore, they also speak the same language, Malay, as that is the national 
language of the land (although they may also freely speak their own languages).
125
 If 
comparison had to be made with other Commonwealth jurisdictions on the intellectual ability 
of the people in Malaysia, it may be appropriate to say that Malaysians are well educated 
now, and they are not too far behind other countries. However, the absence of the RUS may 
not be just in the case of vulnerable accused. A vulnerable accused, in the context of the 
unsworn statement, should not be confined only to those cases discussed in Chapter II of this 
dissertation. The ―Orang Asli‖ or ―aborigines‖ in Malaysia may also be considered to be 
vulnerable.
126
 The aborigines in Malaysia live in their own villages, speak their own 
languages and practise their own cultures.
127
 Therefore, since aboriginal people in Malaysia 
may have limitations engendered by their culture, it is fair to consider them as being 
vulnerable when facing the court process. Though some of the younger generation in the 
community have started migrating to cities for education and working opportunities, the 
majority of the aboriginal people remain comfortable in their ancient way of life. Hence, 
aborigines in Malaysia may be disadvantaged if the RUS is totally abolished. For example, in 
Australia the interest of aboriginal people was an important consideration when considering 
the abolition of the unsworn statement. This is seen in the case of Stuart v The Queen.
128
 Max 
Stuart was an aboriginal accused. According to Michael Kirby J: 
129
 
Dock statements have now all but disappeared in Australia. That issue does not, therefore, 
now arise. One of the reasons that caused some lawyers to support the retention of the facility 
of an unsworn statement before the jury was just such an accused as Max Stuart – illiterate, 
inarticulate, susceptible to cultural norms favouring agreement and discouraging contest. 
It is submitted that the development of effective and efficient legislation can be aided by 
learning from the experience of other countries/states that have abolished the RUS. The 
report from the Aboriginal legal service in Western Australia and Queensland explained that 
the abolition of the RUS in those states has affected the aboriginal people.
130
 This may also 
be likely to happen in Malaysia. 
From the above discussion, it is obvious that abolition of the RUS is almost impossible in 
Malaysia. It is tolerable if the justification to retain the unsworn statement is made in respect 
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of protecting the interest of a vulnerable accused person. Therefore, taking away the RUS 
from the justice system may not be a wise approach, as some sort of mechanism is needed to 
protect vulnerable accused. However, having considered the impact of the RUS on the parties 
in criminal proceedings, to maintain the RUS in its current form is unreasonable. I argue that 
the current characteristics of the RUS are in need of modification. This is crucial because of 
the potential abuse of the current RUS by those who are not at a disadvantage and its possible 
detrimental effect on the court, the prosecution and witnesses. For a better outcome, the RUS 
should only be limited to vulnerable accused. 
Some of the states in Australia have decided to replace the RUS with a more realistic 
approach known as unsworn evidence.
 131
 The same scenario is also seen in other 
Commonwealth countries.  Unsworn evidence offers some characteristics similar to the 
unsworn statement, but it is not freely opted for by the accused as it is available only if the 
court decides so. Hence, I submit that the idea of restricting the RUS to situations where the 
court deems it necessary might address some of the problems with its current operation. 
Therefore, to identify the extent to which the characteristics of unsworn evidence can be 
applied to an unsworn statement, I now discuss the nature of unsworn evidence.  
 
1 Unsworn evidence 
 
It is apparent that the RUS in Malaysian criminal procedure has flaws that need to be 
addressed. The possible reason for this is because there is no exclusivity in its application and 
therefore the RUS is taken for granted and not given proper application by the government. 
To remedy the situation, there may be other mechanisms or adjustments to the existing right 
with better features that could be introduced to the justice system that would provide more 
effective results both to the accused and the state. The unsworn statement is no longer 
available in most Commonwealth jurisdictions, but some overseas jurisdictions have 
provision for narrow categories in which accused can give evidence unsworn. Although their 
nomenclature is similar, the RUS and the provision to give unsworn evidence are different. In 
the former, the accused is not allowed to be cross-examined by the prosecution; in the latter, 
no such restriction is imposed.  
I submit that unsworn evidence is actually available in the Malaysian justice system, but it is 
applied in a certain degree only. At present in Malaysia the RUS is available to accused 
persons from all backgrounds. Its application is unlimited. However, a different approach is 
seen in unsworn evidence in Malaysia. The provision on unsworn evidence defines clearly 
who is eligible to give testimony in court without being sworn. The Malaysian Evidence Act 
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1950 explains that a child of tender years called as a witness in court, who does not 
understand the nature of the oath, may give evidence without an oath.
132
 The provision also 
explains that the unsworn testimony may be accepted as evidence if the court is satisfied that 
the witness understands the duty to tell the truth. A quite similar provision is also seen in the 
Malaysian Oaths and Affirmations Act 1949.
133
 However, both statutes specifically limit the 
applicability of unsworn evidence to child witnesses. This may include a child accused, but 
the application does not cover a vulnerable accused person generally. Therefore, I submit that 
the only option available to a vulnerable accused if they choose to give unsworn testimony is 
through the RUS. 
In England and Wales, unsworn evidence is available to a witness of any age who is 
competent to give evidence but is incapable of appreciating the nature of an oath.
134
 
Meanwhile, the New Zealand Evidence Act 2006 is silent on the category of witness who can 
give unsworn evidence. This is because, from the construction of the words in s 77(4), it 
merely states that the judge has the discretion to allow a statement to be given unsworn with 
the conditions as stipulated in paragraphs (a)-(c).
135
 There is an assumption that one of the 
categories allowed to give unsworn evidence is a witness who is under the age of 12 years,
136
 
or a mentally handicapped person.
137
 In the Australian states covered by the Uniform 
Evidence Act 1995, section 13 explains that a competent witness is not allowed to give sworn 
evidence if he or she is not able to understand the duty of giving truthful evidence.
138
 
Unsworn evidence is applicable to all witness who fit the category under s 13(5) regardless of 
age. The word ―witness‖ may also include an accused. Furthermore, the provisions in these 
jurisdictions do not explicitly deny its use to an accused. I argue that the provision to give 
unsworn evidence in Malaysia should have followed the same approach. Instead of narrowing 
its application to a child witness, it should have broadened the scope by extending its use to 
other vulnerable witnesses, including vulnerable accused.  
The Youth Justice and Evidence Act 1999(England and Wales) explains that a person is also 
considered a competent witness when he or she may give intelligible testimony.
139
 To 
determine this, the court must ensure that the witness understands the question put to him or 
her and is able to give answers that are understandable.
140
 These witnesses are allowed to 
give evidence without being sworn. It is vital for the judge to inform the witness about the 
importance of telling the truth when giving testimony in this way. In Australia, as it stands 
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now the law does not require the court to determine closely whether the witness knows the 
difference between telling the truth and lying in court as part of the test for competence to 
give unsworn evidence.
141
 It is sufficient for the court to inform the witness of the importance 
of telling the truth during their testimony. Likewise in New Zealand, the Law Commission 
recommended the removal of the test for competence to give unsworn evidence for children 
under 12 years and also other witnesses who are permitted by the court to give unsworn 
evidence, especially those who are intellectually disabled.
142
 Research also shows that 
children would have a better understanding of the concept of not telling lies than of a 
requirement that they must tell the truth.
143
 Besides, the evaluation of the truthfulness of a 
witness‘s evidence may be made without the necessity to ensure that the witness understands 
the consequence of a promise.
144
 Although the judge has no duty to make an inquiry as to 
whether the child or other witness understands the meaning of telling the truth, the judge still 
needs to inform the witness of the importance of telling the truth for the purpose of conveying 
the message to the witness of the seriousness of the occasion.
145
 
Even though there is leeway in giving evidence whereby no oath is required, it involves 
similar repercussions as evidence given on oath.
146
 This is a wise step. It is a positive 
approach since it might prevent various interpretations in respect of the value of unsworn 
evidence, an issue that plagues the unsworn statement in Malaysia today. Furthermore, the 
witness giving unsworn evidence in various jurisdictions is not allowed to give false 
evidence. For example, in England and Wales, the provision is clear on the consequence of 
giving false evidence: the offence is stipulated in s 57.
147
 It may prevent the accused from 
giving untruthful evidence as may happen in the unsworn statement, since there is no 
mechanism to prevent the accused from not doing so. Having analysed the approach of some 
of the Commonwealth jurisdictions in regard to unsworn evidence, I submit that England and 
Wales offers a better method. Compared with New Zealand and Australia, England and 
Wales provides a specific provision for unsworn evidence. This allows the characteristics of 
the unsworn evidence to be discussed in more detail by considering all the relevant factors to 
allow a better execution of the unsworn evidence in the case of vulnerable witnesses. Next, I 
discuss the proposal for reform on the unsworn statement. 
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E Recommendations: Modification of the Right to Give an Unsworn Statement 
 
It is obvious from the discussion in this chapter that the Code, particularly s 173(ha), is 
hungry for change. While other Commonwealth jurisdictions have decided to get rid of the 
ancient law and practice of the English legal system, it may not be too late for Malaysia to 
take a similar approach. It has to be borne in mind that the RUS is a right introduced in the 
nineteenth century. Therefore, living in the twenty-first century, it is suggested that laws have 
to be amended to suit changing times. I suggest that there is an urgent need for the RUS to be 
reviewed for the benefit of vulnerable accused as well as of all parties involved in the 
criminal proceedings; and also to ensure that Malaysia is not left behind in the developments 
that have taken place in other jurisdictions of similar legal systems. 
As discussed above, the RUS is now firmly established in Malaysian law and there is popular 
support for its retention. The attempt of the government to allow cross-examination on the 
statement received strong objections from the public. Therefore, taking this fact into 
consideration, a proper approach needs to be taken to recommending reform of the law 
without affecting the sensitivity of the public surrounding the issue. Moreover, it is necessary 
to respect the fact that there would be social, legal and cultural factors that bar its complete 
abolition at the moment. Thus, I propose to limit the RUS to vulnerable accused only to avoid 
abuse of the right.  
My dissertation submits that some of the characteristics of unsworn evidence may be 
applicable to unsworn statements. However, the amendment would not affect the core 
characteristic of an unsworn statement, which is the restriction against cross-examination. It 
is undeniable that the absence of cross-examination of the unsworn statement is the most 
powerful disadvantage of the RUS and that it creates nuisance for the justice system. 
However, preserving the restriction allows greater assistance and protection to be given to 
vulnerable accused persons. It may be submitted that no matter how gentle the prosecution is 
during questioning, the process could still be considered to be frightening to vulnerable 
accused. In addition, under my proposed amendment, the accused may also be convicted of 
perjury resulting from a false statement. Hence, allowing cross-examination and convicted of 
perjury at the same time, as a result of giving unsworn statement, is not very different from 
the way sworn evidence is treated. Therefore, to provide a more effective right to protect a 
vulnerable accused facing the challenge of participating in criminal proceedings must be 
introduced. On that ground, my dissertation proposes a reform so that the RUS and its 
exemption from cross-examination is retained for a limited group of accused, but subjects the 
statement to all the other rules of evidence. A quite similar idea for reform was also seen in 
Victoria, Australia in 1986.
148
 However, as it is now, the statute is not clear on the restriction 
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on cross-examination to an accused who gives unsworn evidence but states that the accused is 
allowed to be asked questions that resemble cross-examination.
149
  
The proposed formulation raises some difficult issues, not least of which is whether the 
unsworn statement as I cast it can be defined as ―evidence‖ under Malaysian law. I now turn 
to my argument that unsworn statement can be considered as evidence next.  
1 Unsworn statement is evidence 
 
Evidence means a relevant ―fact in issue or a collateral fact‖ and such fact must be proved in 
order to support one‘s case.150 When the evidence is admissible, then the weight is left to the 
court to decide. As Lord Simon of Glaisdale stated in the case of DPP v Kilbourne:
151
  
"Weight" of evidence is the degree of probability (both intrinsically and inferentially) which 
is attached to it by the tribunal of fact once it is established to be relevant and admissible in 
law (though its relevance may exceptionally, as will appear, be dependent on its evaluation by 
the tribunal of fact). 
I submit that the unsworn statement could fall under the definition of evidence. Firstly, 
although it is a general rule that oral evidence has to be on oath, there are exceptions to the 
rule.
152
 One of the exceptions is unsworn evidence, whereby it is accepted by the law as being 
as though it were evidence made on oath. The same rule may also be applicable to the 
unsworn statement. Secondly, it is trite law that evidence needs to be tested in order to 
ascertain its truthfulness. However, my dissertation submits that evidence that has not been 
tested could also be received as evidence. Evidence consists of relevant facts, which are 
proved. The law of evidence in Malaysia clearly explains that a relevant fact is proved when 
the court either believes it exists or the existence is so probable that a sensible man would 
assume it exists.
153
 Therefore, regardless of whether it is tested or not, judges have the duty to 
use their wisdom either to believe or disbelieve the existence of facts, which may also include 
a statement given by the accused from the dock. Hence, I conclude that an unsworn statement 
may carry probative value. In the case of Sorgenfrie v The Queen, the Federal Court of 
Australia held that:
154
 
To fail to direct the jury that the statements of fact in the unsworn statement were evidence, 
albeit with the infirmities mentioned, was an error of law. Had the trial judge considered the 
unsworn statement to be evidence having probative value if believed, it was essential that the 
jury be directed with reference to each defence that such evidence may have supported. 
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I argue that some judges in Malaysia do regard unsworn statements as evidence. In the appeal 
case of Ng Hoi Cheu v Public Prosecutor, Chang Ming Tat J disagreed with Smith J in Wong 
Heng Fatt v Public Prosecutor that an unsworn statement is not evidence, and had this to 
say:
155
  
      [9] With all respect, I find myself unable to agree. Section 4(1)(a) reads as follows:– 
     ―Subject to the provisions of section 5 of this Ordinance, oaths shall be taken by the 
following persons- 
       witnesses, that is to say, all persons who may be lawfully examined, or give or be 
required to give evidence, by or before any court or person having, as mentioned in 
section 3 of this Ordinance, authority to examine such person or to receive 
evidence;‖. 
 
[10] Since an accused person can refuse to be examined or to give evidence under his 
undoubted right to elect to venture only a statement from the dock or to remain silent, he 
cannot come within the definition of ―witness‖ in this Ordinance. He may well be a 
witness on his own behalf but this is only to say that he is a competent witness but he is 
never a compellable witness. As a witness, he cannot be administered an oath or an 
affirmation if he chooses to make a statement from the dock, but what he says therefrom 
comes fairly and squarely within the definition of ―evidence‖ in the Evidence Ordinance. 
Even though the view by Chang Ming Tat was not popular among some judges at the time,
156
 
that might have changed today. There was an attempt to re-establish the ratio decidendi in the 
case of Ng Hoi Cheu that an unsworn statement constitutes evidence. This is found in the 
case of Azahan Bin Mohd Aminallah v Public Prosecutor, whereby  Gopal Sri Ram J held:
157
 
 
Without going into the matter in any detail, it suffices for us to say that there is a conflict 
among the High Courts as to whether an unsworn statement from the dock is evidence. Wong 
Heng Fatt v Public Prosecutor [1959] MLJ 20, Public Prosecutor v Sanassi [1970] 2 MLJ 
198, and Low Thim Fatt v Public Prosecutor [1989] 1 MLJ 304 say that it is not evidence. By 
contrast, Chang Min Tat J in Ng Hoi Cheu v Public Prosecutor [1968] 1 MLJ 53 held that it is 
evidence. And there are dicta in many other cases, Malaysian, Australian and at least one 
decided by the Privy Council which say quite emphatically that such an unsworn statement is 
evidence for the purposes of a trial. All the relevant cases may be found in two articles 
published in the Malayan Law Journal. The first is that by that very learned scholar Prof 
Ahmad Ibrahim in [1975] 2 MLJ vi. The other is by Professor Mohd Akram in [2003] 1 MLJ 
clxix. 
 
In our judgment, in the context of s 257(1) the critical phrase is ‗elects to give evidence‘ and 
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not ‗elects to give evidence on oath‘. The former is much wider than the latter and must ex 
necessitae rei include the making of an unsworn statement from the dock. We are therefore 
persuaded that the reasoning of Chang Min Tat J in Ng Hoi Cheu v Public Prosecutor is 
correct. Accordingly, the fact that the appellant elected to make an unsworn statement from 
the dock did not exclude the operation of s 257(1).  
A consideration of the judgments of the courts clearly shows that some judges in Malaysia do 
regard unsworn statements as evidence even though there is neither proper explanation in the 
statute as to whether an unsworn statement falls under the definition of evidence, nor can the 
statement be tested by cross-examination. Hence, it is submitted that with more proper and 
clearer guidance on the application of the RUS in the legislation, it may not be difficult to 
accept an unsworn statement as evidence in Malaysia. My dissertation submits that the 
proposed amendment would assist the court in dealing with the issue of unworn statements in 
the future. This is because, instead of depending on the case law to decide on the status of the 
statement, having clear guidelines in the statute is obviously a more persuasive approach.  
(a) Recommendation 1 
 
At the moment, the Malaysian Evidence Act 1950 does not provide a definition of 
―statement‖. This is in contrast to the law in some other jurisdictions: for example, in New 
Zealand the term ―statement‖ is clearly spelled out in the statute.158 However, the law in 
Malaysia provides for the definition of ―evidence‖. Apparently, the word ―statement‖ is one 
of the main elements in determining what is meant by evidence in Malaysia. However, the 
statute does not give a clear interpretation as to whether a statement made without an oath can 
be considered as evidence or not. This is one of the reasons why the status of the unsworn 
statement has become a difficult and longstanding issue. Towards this end, the Malaysian 
Evidence Act needs to be amended, particularly s 3. I propose that the definition of what 
constitutes ―evidence‖ should also include an unsworn statement.  
The original provision in s 3 is as follows: 
 Section 3. Interpretation 
―evidence‖ includes— 
(a) all statements which the court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses in 
relation to matters of fact under inquiry: such statements are called oral evidence; 
(b) all documents produced for the inspection of the court: such documents are called 
documentary evidence; 
The suggested amendment is as follows: 
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―evidence‖ includes— 
(a) all statements, including an unsworn statement, which the court permits or requires to 
be made before it by witnesses in relation to matters of fact under inquiry: such statements are 
called oral evidence; 
(b) all documents produced for the inspection of the court: such documents are called 
documentary evidence; 
(b) Recommendation 2 
 
To avoid any misuse of the RUS, it is also suggested that the application of the right should 
be limited only to the accused for whom is it really appropriate to use the right. As the RUS 
stands now, it is applicable to all accused in Malaysia. Therefore, the RUS is open to a degree 
of abuse that would eventually bring the criminal justice process into disrepute. The ability 
for all accused to give an unsworn statement also contributes to the notion that the RUS is 
out-dated and no longer relevant to the modern legal system, because the underpinning 
justification for the RUS does not apply to most accused. However, if the application of the 
RUS is narrowed down by empowering the court to use its discretion to determine whether 
the accused can give an unsworn statement or not, such undesirable perceptions may be 
reduced. It is submitted that nervousness or fear should not be sufficient grounds for entitling 
an accused to give an unsworn statement. This is because nervousness is not a sufficiently 
adequate means to measure one‘s vulnerability. Besides, if this is allowed, it is not impossible 
that a majority of the accused would be entitled to choose this right.  
Therefore, my dissertation suggests that new provisions are incorporated in chapter IX of the 
Malaysian Evidence Act 1950, that part being concerned with witnesses. Section 118 of the 
Malaysian Evidence Act concerning who is competent to testify could be referred to as a 
basis to determine who is eligible to give an unsworn statement. The reason I suggest the 
eligibility to give an unsworn statement could be based on s 118 rather than solely depending 
on the scope of a vulnerable person as proposed in s 2 of the Code is because the former 
provision deals with the issue of the competency of a witness in Malaysia more generally. Its 
scope is wider and therefore it allows the RUS to be extended to other vulnerable witnesses. 
Besides that, this provision explains what conditions in witnesses may affect their 
competence to testify in court. It clarifies that these types of witnesses may have difficulty in 
understanding the questions asked, which may hinder them from giving reasonable answers. 
The Evidence Act explains how a witness of tender years should be dealt with by the court.
159
 
However, nowhere does the statute explain the approach that should be taken by the court 
when dealing with witnesses who suffer from conditions other than ―tender years‖, as 
mentioned in the provision. Therefore, this dissertation suggests that the conditions set out in 
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this provision may be a valuable yardstick to determine a person‘s eligibility to give an 
unsworn statement in court. Unlike the definition of vulnerable person in the proposed s 2 of 
the Code that deals specifically with a child or a person having a mental impairment, I argue 
the phrase ―any other cause of the same kind‖ in s 118 gives wide discretion to the court to 
determine which other possible witness/accused that may fall under this category.  I therefore 
submit, aboriginal people, who are vulnerable, may well fall under the same category.  
Section 118 reads as follows: 
All persons shall be competent to testify unless the court considers that they are prevented 
from understanding the questions put to them or from giving rational answers to those 
questions by tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body or mind, or any other 
cause of the same kind. 
Explanation—A mentally disordered person or a lunatic is not incompetent to testify 
unless he is prevented by his condition from understanding the questions put to him 
and giving rational answers to them. 
After identifying who is eligible to give an unsworn statement, the next important thing is to 
outline the characteristics of the RUS. At the moment, provisions that deal with the 
characteristics of an unsworn statement in Malaysia are very limited. Hence, I propose a new 
provision be inserted into the Evidence Act 1950 to define the characteristics of an unsworn 
statement. For this purpose, it appears that the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
(England and Wales) 1999
160
 offers a useful legislative model. The reason I choose to adopt 
the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is because this statute explains clearly 
how to deal with unsworn evidence. This may be a useful step-by-step guide for unsworn 
statements as well. It gives explicit guidelines not only to the court but also to other parties in 
the criminal proceedings as to what to expect when an unsworn statement is allowed by the 
court.  
The insertion of these proposed sections could be made after the discussion on who may 
testify, as found in s 118. To avoid any disruption to other sections, these new sections may 
be drafted as s 118A and 118B. 
The suggested additional provisions are as follows: 
Section 118A 
Reception of unsworn statement. 
(1) Subsections (2) and (3) apply to a person (of any age) who— 
    (a) is competent to give evidence in criminal proceedings, but  
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(b) by virtue of section 118 is not competent to testify on oath in such proceedings or who 
falls within the meaning of a vulnerable person in s 2 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code.  
(2) The statement in criminal proceedings of a person to whom this subsection applies shall 
be given unsworn from the dock and no cross-examination is allowed. 
(3) A deposition of unsworn statement given by a person to whom this subsection applies 
may be taken for the purposes of criminal proceedings as if that statement had been given on 
oath.  
(4) A court in criminal proceedings shall accordingly receive in evidence any statement 
given unsworn in pursuance of subsection (2) or (3).  
(5) Where a person (―the witness‖) who is competent to give evidence in criminal 
proceedings gives a statement in such proceedings unsworn, no conviction, a verdict or 
finding in those proceedings shall be taken to be unsafe for the purpose of section 307 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code (procedure for appeal) by reason only that it appears to the 
Appellate Court that the witness was a person competent to testify under section 118 (and 
should accordingly have given his evidence on oath).  
 
Section 118B 
Penalty for giving false unsworn statement 
(1) If such a person wilfully gives a false statement in such circumstances that, had the 
evidence been given on oath, he would have been guilty of perjury, he shall be guilty of an 
offence and liable on summary conviction under s 14 of the Oaths and Affirmations Act 
1949.  
To suit the situation in Malaysia, some modifications are made to the original provisions in 
England and Wales. The modifications are as highlighted. The word ―evidence‖ in the 
original provision is to be changed to ―statement‖. Section (1)(b) explicitly lays down the 
criteria for a person who is eligible to give an unsworn statement. Besides those who are not 
competent to testify under s 118, it also comprises the vulnerable person as defined in the 
Code, which includes vulnerable accused as well. Restriction of cross-examination is made 
clear, as found in subsection (2). The proposed s 118A(3) suggests that the unsworn 
statement should be treated as evidence given on oath. Therefore, I submit that the  
Malaysian Oaths and Affirmations Act 1949 is applicable. The statement will still be 
considered as evidence, but with a lesser weight since the statement is not tested. The same 
rule applies to unsworn evidence.
161
 This is to differentiate between sworn evidence and the 
unsworn statement. I submit, although the weight given is less, the situation is still much 
better than that relating to the current unsworn statement, where the evidential value is very 
ambiguous due to its uncertain evidential status. As for the provision in regard to summary 
conviction for giving false evidence in s 118B, my dissertation chooses not to lay down the 
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sentence in the proposed section as can be seen in the original provision in the Youth Justice 
and Evidence Act 1999.
162
 However, this dissertation applies the provision in the Oaths and 
Affirmations Act 1949 in Malaysia, since that statute deals with summary punishment for 
perjury in open court.  
(c) Recommendation 3 
 
When the use of the RUS is clearer in the legislation, particularly the Malaysian Evidence 
Act 1950, it is submitted that the Code will need to be reviewed to avoid any unwelcome 
discussion on the application of the RUS in the future. Therefore, this dissertation suggests 
that s 173(ha) of the Code be amended accordingly. Currently, the provision is as follows: 
  
Section 173. Procedure in summary trials. 
 The following procedure shall be observed by Magistrates in summary trials: 
(ha)When the Court calls upon the accused to enter on his defence under subparagraph (h)(i), 
the Court shall read and explain the three options to the accused which are as follows: 
(i) to give sworn evidence in the witness box;  
(ii) to give unsworn statement from the dock; or 
(iii) to remain silent. 
 
To suit the reform as proposed in the Malaysian Evidence Act 1950, this dissertation suggests 
the provision be amended as follows: 
Section 173. Procedure in summary trials. 
 The following procedure shall be observed by Magistrates in summary trials: 
(ha)When the Court calls upon the accused to enter on his defence under subparagraph (h)(i), 
the Court shall read and explain the three options to the accused which are as follows: 
(i) to give sworn evidence in the witness box;  
(ii) to give unsworn statement from the dock (subject to the conditions set out 
in section 118A of the Evidence Act 1950); or 
(iii) to remain silent. 
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F        The possible Benefit from the Amendments 
 
It is believed this modification will provide balance in regard to the RUS, since even though 
the accused can avoid cross-examination by the prosecution, he or she is still subject to 
certain rules and procedures. This can happen because, when the unsworn statement falls 
under the definition of evidence, the rules of evidence apply. It provides justice to the other 
parties in the criminal trial since the accused is not given total freedom when giving a 
statement from the dock. This may reduce the tendency of giving hearsay and/or irrelevant 
statements and the accused will be prohibited by the law from attacking the character of the 
prosecution‘s witness. Through this amendment, the court will have the power under the law 
to intervene and prohibit the accused from giving further irrelevant statements. In addition, 
the prosecution or the co-accused‘s counsel may also raise an objection about any statement 
that is irrelevant or inadmissible. The accused would also be subjected to a penalty if he or 
she tells lies in court. One major contribution from this proposal is that it would enhance the 
quality of the statement, as the vulnerable accused would no longer have the courage to give 
an untruthful statement.  
This recommendation would also make a huge difference to the criminal justice system in 
Malaysia. This is because, by limiting the scope of the RUS (which would be allowed only to 
accused who are eligible), it may prevent the RUS from being abused further by those 
accused who do not need such protection. It also allows judges to exercise their judicial time 
more effectively since the time required for the court to hear the statement from the dock 
could be reduced. Furthermore, if the unsworn statement is given the same status as evidence 
given on oath, it may prevent further debate on its evidential value in the future. The reason is 
that the courts and legal practitioners have consistently formed different views on the 
evidential value of the statement from the dock and critiques are also seen from legal scholars 
on this matter.
163
 It is submitted that these reform ideas could achieve the objective of the 
RUS – to reduce the risk of wrongful conviction of vulnerable or innocent accused – since the 
statement given falls under the definition of evidence and reduces the risk that it would not be 
taken into consideration by judges in coming to their verdicts.
164
 This might not only assist 
vulnerable accused in facing the court process more confidently, but also might ensure that 
the statement given in court will be given weight as it should be.  
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G Summary 
 
After an in-depth analysis of the RUS in Malaysia, it is abundantly clear that the current 
features of the RUS are defective. However, to abolish the RUS is almost impossible in 
Malaysia, having considered the cultural background of the people and the public‘s objection 
to allowing cross-examination of accused who choose to give an unsworn statement. The 
above discussion also indicates that the RUS may actually operate as a protection to 
vulnerable accused if proper research is done on how it may work for that purpose. Therefore 
I have suggested modifications to the RUS by applying some of the characteristics of the 
unsworn evidence in the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 of England and 
Wales that are relevant to an unsworn statement. I argued that it is possible for the unsworn 
statement to be given evidential status in the Malaysian Evidence Act 1950. I submit that this 
chapter gives a useful guideline to the Malaysian legislature to look at the RUS in a different 
perspective and make the RUS really effective as protection to vulnerable accused who 
choose to give a statement from the dock. 
Next, I discuss the other current protection available in Malaysia, that is, the RRS, and 
examine why it does not help vulnerable accused much in criminal trials 
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IV  Current Protection: Right to Remain Silent 
 
Unlike the RUS, the RRS is still available in most Commonwealth jurisdictions. The two 
rights have similarities, and both face criticism; but the RRS is still accepted in the common 
law countries. One strong critic was Jeremy Bentham as cited by R H Helmholz, who 
contended that the RRS was ―a product of irrational prejudice, one for which no convincing 
justification could be advanced.‖165 Regardless of the criticism, the RRS is seen as one of the 
protections for accused persons, especially vulnerable ones, against self-incriminatory 
statements in criminal trials. The overseas approach to the RRS is not quite the same as that 
in Malaysia. This is the main argument in this chapter. I argue that the objective of the RRS 
to protect vulnerable accused from making self-incriminatory statements in court is not fully 
recognised by the Malaysian criminal justice system. As a result, the RRS has become a 
sword rather than a shield for vulnerable accused.  
To provide a better picture on how the RRS works in Malaysia, I discuss in Part A the 
original intention of the RRS and its relationship with the principle of a fair trial. In Part B, I 
explain that the RRS in Malaysia does not protect the vulnerable accused since the court has 
its own interpretation as to how to deal with the RRS. This happens when the RRS is heavily 
relied on to determine prima facie case. Furthermore, the current law does not give a clear 
guideline to the court on how to explain the effect of remaining silent at trial to the accused. 
This is detrimental to vulnerable accused, who may not understand the court procedures well. 
Hence, in Part C, I propose the Malaysian legislature introduce an adverse inference in the 
Code regarding the accused‘s choice to remain silent at trial. I refer to the Singapore Criminal 
Procedure Code 2010 as a guideline for this amendment. 
 
A The Right to Remain Silent and Fair Trial Principle 
 
The RRS derived from the Latin maxim nemo tenatur seipsum which means ―no person shall 
be compelled to accuse himself.‖166 Historically, the RRS emerged as a result of the practices 
of the English Courts of Star Chamber and High Commission.
167
 These courts were abolished 
in 1641 when the practices of the courts, which forced the accused to take an oath and, on 
failure to do that, caused the accused to be tortured, were ruled to be unlawful.
168
 Therefore, 
to protect the accused against such improper procedure, the privilege against self-
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incrimination was introduced to allow the accused to say nothing that could incriminate 
them.
169
 This was eventually accepted and practised by the Common Law courts.  
The privilege against self-incrimination and the RRS have international recognition and are 
the main components for a fair trial procedure.
170
 The case of Saunders v United Kingdom 
clearly explains the rationale of the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-
incrimination as:
171
 
Their rationale lies, inter alia, in the protection of the accused against improper compulsion 
by the authorities thereby contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages of justice and to the 
fulfilment of the aims of Article 6…The right not to incriminate oneself, in particular, 
presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the 
accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in 
defiance of the will of the accused. In this sense the right is closely linked to the presumption 
of innocence contained in Article 6.2 of the Convention. 
The right not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned, however, with respecting the will 
of an accused person to remain silent. 
The rights of the accused person pre-trial and at trial are safeguarded by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR) and, since Malaysia is one of the United 
Nation‘s members, such rights are also recognised by the Malaysian justice system.172 
Although the RRS is not explicitly mentioned in the UDHR, it may be inferred from some 
relevant provisions of the declaration.
173
 In Malaysia, the rights of the accused are 
incorporated into its Federal Constitution and the rights against self-incrimination may be 
implied in art 5 of the Constitution. To determine whether the RRS in Malaysia meets the 
requirement for a fair trial in the UDHR, I discuss the elements of the fair trial principle next. 
1 Protection to innocent accused 
 
The original concept of the RRS is as a tool to protect an innocent accused from being 
wrongfully convicted.
174
 This is because if innocent accused persons are put under pressure to 
speak, there is the risk that they will produce testimony unfavourable to their case.
175
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However, some argue that innocent accused persons should not be afraid to testify in court if 
they have logical explanations to demonstrate their lack of involvement in criminal 
activities.
176
 There are views that the RRS benefits not only the innocent but also those who 
are not.
177
 Arguments that the RRS could protect an innocent accused from false conviction 
are probably relevant to a minority of cases.
178
 This is because not every accused who 
chooses to remain silent is innocent, and it may not be an exaggeration to argue that most 
accused persons who choose to say nothing are those who are guilty and who want to escape 
conviction.
179
 Moreover, allowing the accused to remain silent would cause a significant 
disadvantage to the government because it ―may be denied access to a good deal of relevant 
and reliable evidence.‖180 As Glanville Williams stated, although juries would convict silent 
accused, there are circumstances under which these accused are acquitted for the reason that 
the juries are not keen to convict a person whom they do not hear.
181
 That might bring the 
criminal justice process into disrepute.  
Nevertheless, just because the RRS might protect only a minority from wrongful conviction 
does not negate its usefulness in a due process context, and there may be many reasons why 
the accused would choose not to say anything during the trial.
182
 One of the reasons could be 
advice from the accused‘s legal representatives, especially when the accused or suspects are 
vulnerable.
183
 In addition, the accused may also refuse to testify for fear of not being able to 
give a good impression to the court because of an inability to respond to the questions well.
184
 
There is also the possibility that the accused would choose to remain silent because he or she 
may be protecting other persons or have done some immoral (but not illegal) activity that he 
or she does not want known to others.
185
 
Furthermore, to protect an accused from the negative effects of previous conviction(s) may 
also be one of the factors. This situation was explained in the case of Blake v R when Ronald 
Young J held:
186
 
However we are satisfied, given the appellant‘s evidence before us, that if he had been 
accurately advised about the unlikely possibility of his previous convictions being the subject 
of cross-examination he would still have elected not to give evidence. Mr Blake made it clear 
in his evidence that he considered if the jury did get to hear of his previous convictions he had 
no possibility of a fair trial and no real hope of an acquittal. As he said in his affidavit, filed in 
                                                          
176
Leng, above n 175, at 116. 
177
At 116. 
178Glanville Williams ―The Tactic of Silence‖ (1987) 137 NLJ 1107 at 3 of the electronic page (no hardcopy 
available). 
179
At 3. 
180
Dennis, above n 174, at 354. 
181
 Williams ―The Tactic of Silence‖, above n 178, at 2. 
182
 A A S Zuckerman ―Criminal Law Revision Committee 11th Report, Right of Silence‖ (1973) 36 MLR 509 at 
511. 
183
Leng, above n 175, at 113. 
184
Elisabeth McDonald Principles of Evidence in Criminal Cases (Brookers, Wellington, 2012) at 264. 
185
Blake v R [2010] NZCA 61 at [18]. 
186
 At [33]. 
49 
 
 
 
support of the appeal, ―It was my view that I would inevitably be convicted if the jury learnt 
of this‖ (referring to his previous convictions). 
2 The presumption of innocence and the burden of proof 
 
Every human being should be treated as innocent until proven otherwise.
187
 This presumption 
of innocence is one of the fundamental values in a criminal justice system.
188
 Theoretically, 
the fundamental principle in a criminal case is that the burden to prove a case rests on the 
prosecution‘s shoulders.189 This principle is important to protect against error in the criminal 
process and also to balance the power and resources of the state and of the accused person.
190
 
Therefore, a person who is presumed innocent should not be compelled to give incriminatory 
evidence that would facilitate the prosecution‘s case.191 This is the principle that connects the 
RRS and the privilege against self-incrimination.
192
 Wigmore described the criminal process 
as being like combat, and one should not be forced to assist the enemy‘s case, which would 
affect his or her own victory.
193
 It is undeniable that there are actual significant differences in 
power between the state and an individual. Therefore, it might be accepted that the RRS can 
work as a tool to minimise the differences and to benefit vulnerable accused. This is the 
reason the prosecution is bestowed with a heavy duty to prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt, which may be seen as one of the ways to reduce the inequality of arms.
194
 
As Lord Sankey LC in Woolmington v DPP says:
 195
 
Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is always to be seen, that 
it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner‘s guilt subject to what I have already 
said as to the defence of insanity and subject also to any statutory exception. 
 
Therefore, the accused is protected against self-incrimination and may refuse to give 
evidence since the burden to prove the case is on the prosecution at all times.
196
 The principle 
of the privilege against self-incrimination is that since the state is obviously more powerful 
than the accused, the privilege that allows the accused to refrain from testifying could reduce 
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the impact of non-cooperation with the state.
197
 Furthermore, it is not proper to draw an 
inference on silence if there is no solid evidence to connect a person with the crime.
198
 
It may be reasonable to assert that there is a need to preserve the RRS for the benefit of the 
accused who refuse to say anything about the charge brought against them. Furthermore, one 
of the salient factors of the RRS is to ensure that no innocent person is convicted as a result 
of a self-incriminatory statement.
199
 In addition, the availability of the RRS could also 
prevent miscarriage of justice as well as preventing the accused from facing unnecessary 
charges such as contempt of court for refusing to give evidence.  
However, the benefit to the innocent accused is arguably limited.
200
 This particularly applies 
in the Malaysian context, where there is an absence of a clear provision regarding the RRS in 
the Constitution. The RRS could actually have a reverse effect for innocent people whereby 
the RRS, which is thought to be protecting vulnerable accused, could eventually lead to 
conviction because of the accused‘s failure to provide evidence to rebut the charge. To 
illustrate how this may occur, I now turn to the practice of the RRS in Malaysia.  
 
B The Right to Remain Silent in Malaysian Criminal Trials 
 
The RRS is crucial in other jurisdictions to minimise the risk of convicting the innocent,
201
 
but it has taken a different turn in Malaysia. It may be submitted that the purpose of inserting 
the RRS in the Code is not so much to provide protection to the accused against any 
incriminatory statement or to protect the innocent accused, but rather as a tool to determine 
the prima facie case. This has become the core issue when discussing the RRS in Malaysia. I 
argue that the choice to remain silent at trial as provided for in the Code is just an empty 
promise of the criminal justice system to a vulnerable accused person. To explain the 
situation better, I now turn the discussion to how the RRS is treated in Malaysian criminal 
trials. 
1 Prima facie test 
 
It is trite law that the prosecution needs only to prove a prima facie case at the end of the 
prosecution‘s case and that proof beyond reasonable doubt is required at the end of the 
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defence case.
202
 If the prosecution fails to prove a prima facie case, the accused will be 
acquitted.
203
 However, the issue of prima facie in Malaysia is one of flux and debate; and that 
being so, there is detriment to the vulnerable accused in relying on the RRS because the 
applicable standard for prima facie is unclear and may vary. Until 1997, the required standard 
of proof at the end of the prosecution‘s case was proof beyond reasonable doubt, whereby it 
required maximum evaluation to be made on the prosecution‘s evidence.204 This is apparent 
from the wording of the provision that ―if unrebutted would warrant his conviction‖.205  
The Code was amended in 1997 to explain that the prosecution needs to prove a prima facie 
case before the accused could be called to enter a defence,
206
 but the term ―prima facie‖ was 
not defined. The absence of a definition of prima facie for this purpose has caused uncertainty 
in the courts regarding the correct principle to apply; whether the maximum evaluation 
principle as decided by the Federal Court in the case of Arulpragasan Sandaraju v Public 
Prosecutor,
207
 or the minimum evaluation principle, as laid down by the Privy Council in the 
earlier case of Haw Tua Tau.
208
 Maximum evaluation would lead to immediate acquittal if 
the prosecution fails to prove the evidence beyond doubt, whereas minimum evaluation is 
where some believable evidence exists to secure a conviction and it would give the 
prosecution a second chance to get a conviction if there is weakness in the defence‘s 
evidence.
209
 The lack of a clear definition of the term ―prima facie‖ in the statute at that time 
has affected the proper evaluation of the prosecution‘s evidence.210 The court at that time 
tried to remedy the situation by coming out with its own interpretation of how to determine 
prima facie. In Balachandran v Public Prosecutor, the Federal Court held that if the accused 
does not give evidence during the trial, the correct test is:
211
  
Thus if the accused elects to remain silent he must be convicted. The test at the close of the 
case for the prosecution would therefore be: Is the evidence sufficient to convict the accused 
if he elects to remain silent? If the answer is in the affirmative then a prima facie case has 
been made out. This must, as of necessity, require a consideration of the existence of any 
reasonable doubt in the case for the prosecution. If there is any such doubt there can be no 
prima facie case. 
This is when the dilemma concerning the RRS in Malaysia began. This test suggests that the 
term ―if unrebutted‖ is inferred from the accused‘s silence. However, such requirement is not 
mentioned explicitly in the statute. It is a principle developed by the highest court of the land 
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that has now become the leading case on this issue. I submit that there is a flaw in the 
principle and it is misleading. It triggers two main questions. First, does the remaining silent 
here mean the accused‘s silence even if the defence leads other evidence? Or, second, does it 
mean the accused offers no evidence at all either himself or herself or through other 
witnesses? I argue that if the intention of the case is the accused‘s silence per se, it is in 
conflict with the original aims of the RRS, that is, to protect against self-incrimination. 
However, if it means that the accused does not offer any evidence, either himself or herself or 
through other witness, it should be made clear in the test that the silence means the defence 
offers no evidence at all. Even though subsequently the Code was amended on 7 September 
2007 to explain that prima facie means ―the prosecution has adduced credible evidence 
proving each ingredient of the offence which if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a 
conviction‖212 (with the intention to restore the principle in Haw Tua Tau: that prima facie 
requires minimum evaluation),
213
  the principle in Balachandran continues to be followed. 
214
 
This principle is not only conveniently followed by the judges, but also by legal scholars. 
Choong Kwai Fatt wrote in his article:
215
 
The accused cannot be compelled to give evidence but he must risk the consequences if he 
does not do so. Since the court, in ruling that a prima facie case has been made out, must be 
satisfied that the evidence adduced can be overthrown only by evidence in rebuttal it follows 
that if it is not rebutted it must prevail. Thus if the accused elects to remain silent he must be 
convicted. The judge has no alternative but to conclude that the accused is guilty of the events 
he is charged with and sentence him in accordance to the judicial principles and precedent 
cases. 
It makes the position of the RRS in Malaysia complicated. It may not be correct to use the 
words ―remain silent‖ to explain ―if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction‖. 
In Balachandran‘s case, the test as quoted above clearly explains that ―if the accused elects to 
remain silent he must be convicted.‖ The accused‘s silence should be treated individually and 
not to represent the absence of evidence in the defence case as a whole. This is where the 
situation of the RRS in Malaysia differs from the overseas approach. In other jurisdictions, 
the accused‘s silence alone should not infer guilt because there could be other evidence 
adduced to support his or her defence. Furthermore, silence of the accused is not used as a 
tool to determine prima facie case. The approach in New Zealand may be worth looking at on 
this issue. In a trial by judge alone, the relevant test applicable at the end of the prosecution‘s 
case is: ―is there some evidence (not inherently credible) which, if accepted as accurate, 
would establish each element of the offence so that the trier of fact could convict?‖216 Hence, 
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the standard to be applied is of prima facie standard and not beyond reasonable doubt.
217
 To 
add, Speight J says in the case of Auckland City Council v Jenkins:
218
 
Though this is English practice being discussed, the same procedure appears properly 
applicable in New Zealand. A tribunal deciding whether or not there is a case to answer must 
decide whether a finding of guilt could be made by a reasonable jury or a reasonable judicial 
officer sitting alone on the evidence thus far presented. He is ruling in fact whether it is 
"prima facie" — a well understood phrase. A ruling that there is a prima facie case does not 
mean that of necessity if there is no evidence by way of rebuttal that a conviction must 
follow. It is merely that a conviction can properly follow and not be upset as being one which 
could not be made by a fact finding tribunal acting reasonably. 
I argue that the principle in Balachandran‘s case may be misinterpreted by the courts of 
lower jurisdiction. It may not be too exaggerated to submit that some judges or magistrates 
might understand that the silence of the accused in itself means a prima facie case is proved 
(with the requirements of credible evidence adduced by the prosecution that proved each 
ingredient of the offence). Therefore, for vulnerable accused who may want to choose to 
remain silent in a criminal trial in Malaysia, this is the danger that they may face. 
I argue that the principle in Balachandran‘s case should no longer be followed by succeeding 
cases. It is my view that the current provision in the Code is sufficient to determine prima 
facie. This is because to require the prosecution to adduce credible evidence that proves each 
ingredient of the offence such that, if left unexplained, it would warrant a conviction should 
in itself be sufficient for the court to decide prima facie. It is very clear from the constructions 
of the words in the provision that prima facie is proved when there is no evidence at all 
adduced by the defence that could throw doubt on the prosecution‘s case. Hence, the silence 
of the accused should not be used as the yardstick to determine the same. Besides that, to put 
such a ―test‖ at the stage of the prosecution‘s case to determine prima may be a judgmental 
approach. I therefore submit, to continue keeping the principle adopted in Balachandran‘s 
case alive undermines the spirit of the RRS and is in conflict with the right against self-
incrimination.  
2 Effect of the Right to Remain Silent 
 
Although s 173(ha) of the Code says that the court must ―read and explain‖ to the accused the 
three choices available at the defence stage, it does not spell out clearly what are the proper 
words to be used to make sure the accused understands the implications of the choices well; 
especially on the RRS. Without a clear warning about the ramifications of remaining silent, it 
may be impossible for an accused, particularly a vulnerable accused, to understand the effect 
of remaining silent. It is arguable that this provision does not really provide sufficient 
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protection to any accused, but particularly the vulnerable accused. The situation is worsened 
when the accused is not legally represented. Therefore, I argue that it is time for the 
Malaysian legislature to consider a possible mechanism that would at least reduce the risk of 
a vulnerable accused choosing the RRS. The approaches by other jurisdictions in this respect 
are worth considering.  
(a) Adverse inference 
 
The popular approach in dealing with the accused‘s silence is to draw an adverse inference. 
In England and Wales, under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the law permits 
the court or the jury to draw an inference against the accused for their failure to answer the 
case without good reason.
219
 Compared with the law in England, the Australian courts will 
not draw an inference on an accused‘s statement in court that was never offered during 
investigation at the pre-trial stage.
220
 The court is allowed to comment if the accused chooses 
not to give evidence in court, with the exception of the prosecution.
221
 Although the judge is 
allowed to comment, it must not imply that the accused is guilty of the offence because he or 
she chooses to remain silent.
222
 A rather similar approach is seen in New Zealand. The statute 
allows comment to be made by the judges, the accused and the accused‘s counsel, but not by 
the prosecution.
223
 In the case of R v Accused, the court held that the reason comment by the 
prosecution on the accused‘s failure to testify is prohibited is to avoid undermining the 
accused when they choose to exercise the right.
224
 This protection is further strengthened by 
the existence of the same restriction in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
225
 
To argue whether adverse inference is practical or not in Malaysia since trial is by judge 
alone, I submit that the best example for Malaysia is Singapore. Singapore, like Malaysia, 
uses trial by judge alone and no longer has a jury system. The law in Singapore, a 
neighbouring country with an equivalent legal system, has improved significantly over the 
years. Its criminal justice system also provides RRS to the accused at trial,
226
 but the RRS 
does not receive the same treatment as in Malaysia. The RRS will not guarantee the 
prosecution a conviction but instead the statute explains that the court may draw an inference 
on the accused‘s silence after the prosecution has successfully proved its case.227 Singapore‘s 
Criminal Procedure Code 2010 requires the judge to inform the accused that, upon their 
failure to testify in court, an adverse inference will be drawn and the court may use that 
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silence against him or her.
228
 The accused is not convicted on his or her silence but for the 
reason that the prosecution has adduced sufficient evidence to prove his or her involvement in 
the crime.
229
 The proper words on how to warn the accused are explicitly mentioned in the 
provision. Through this clarity, the accused will understand better the effect of his or her 
choice to remain silent.  
However, such a warning does not exist in Malaysia‘s criminal procedure code. This is where 
the implication of having the RUS as a precondition to determine prima facie is detrimental 
to an accused who is not well versed with the court‘s process. Section 173(ha) of the Code 
does not deal with this requirement in detail. It only explicates briefly on the need to read and 
explain the options to the accused, but without proper guidance. Therefore, the court is not 
procedurally wrong if it does not explain in detail or effectively the effect of remaining silent 
at trial. This is where the choice to remain silent starts to become ineffective as a protection 
to vulnerable accused, as there is a strong possibility that vulnerable accused would be more 
comfortable choosing to remain silent in court.  
 
I argue that although Malaysian law does not provide an express provision on the drawing of 
an adverse inference, the court is actually drawing an adverse inference from an accused‘s 
silence, whereby if the accused chooses to remain silent when the defence case is called, the 
court may convict him or her for the offence since no sufficient evidence is adduced to rebut 
the prosecution‘s case.230 Therefore, it would be wise to have the provision on the drawing of 
an adverse inference stated explicitly in the Code. This may help to avoid the confusion on 
how to deal with the accused‘s silence. There may be possible objections towards introducing 
an adverse inference on the accused‘s silence. Some argue that allowing the court to draw an 
adverse inference may encourage the accused to give evidence in court.
 231
 Hence, there is a 
view that even though such a step may sound just, the fundamental right to ―liberty, dignity 
and privacy‖ of a person should not be taken lightly and it is the responsibility of the law 
maker to ensure that there is a balance between the interest of the individual in a criminal 
proceeding through the provision of proper safeguards and the interest of society. 
232
 
However, I consider this is a better approach rather than providing nothing to alert the 
accused about the consequences of his or her choice when the ramifications of it are grave. 
 
Moreover, allowing an adverse inference may not necessarily do an injustice to the accused 
who choose to remain silent in court. As Lord Diplock mentioned in Haw Tua Tau v Public 
Prosecutor: 
233
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English law has always recognised the right of the decider of fact in a criminal trial to draw 
inferences from the failure of a defendant to exercise his right to give evidence and thereby 
submit to cross-examination. It would in any event be hopeless to expect jurors or Judges, as 
reasonable men, to refrain from doing so. Although the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 
prohibited the prosecution itself from inviting the jury to draw inferences from the accused's 
failure to testify in his own defence, it did not prohibit Judges from commenting on such 
failure: very often the Judge did comment and draw to the attention of the jury inferences that 
they may properly draw, if they thought fit, from the failure of the accused to go into the 
witness box to contradict the evidence of the prosecution on matters that were within his own 
knowledge or to displace a natural inference as to his mental attitude at the time of the alleged 
offence that, in the absence of some other explanation, would properly be drawn by any 
reasonable person from his conduct at that time. 
After analysing the RRS in Malaysia, it is obvious that there are flaws on how the RRS is 
dealt with by the Malaysian judiciary. To rectify the defect, I recommend the introduction of 
a proviso on the drawing of an adverse inference from the exercise of the option to remain 
silent at trial in order to alert the accused to the effect of his or her decision. 
 
C Recommendation: To provide a Proviso on the Drawing of an Adverse Inference from 
the Accused’s Choice to Remain Silent in Court 
 
I suggest the Malaysian legislature consider introducing a proviso on the drawing of an 
adverse inference on the accused‘s silence at trial. To do this, the Singapore Criminal 
Procedure Code 2010 is a useful reference since the statute clearly spells out the warning that 
needs to be read to the accused before they choose how or whether to give evidence at the 
defence stage.
234
 However, to suit the Malaysian situation, some modifications are necessary. 
Instead of suggesting the introduction of the full proviso, I propose the Malaysian legislature 
adopt the relevant part for the right to silence only.  
 
I propose s 173(ha)(iii) be amended as follows: 
 
Section 173(ha) 
 
(iii) to remain silent. 
 
―if you elect not to give evidence in the witness box, that is to say, remain silent, then I must 
tell you that the court in deciding whether you are guilty or not, may draw such inferences as 
appear proper from your refusal to give evidence, including inferences that may be adverse to 
you. 
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Let me also say, whichever course you take, it is open to you to call other evidence in your 
own defence. You may confer with your counsel on the course you wish to take. 
 
I now call upon you to give evidence in your own defence. How do you elect?‖ 
 
D The possible Benefit from the Amendment 
 
I submit that if the law is amended to include this explanation of the provision to remain 
silent, the confusion regarding the RRS may cease. This is because this amended provision is 
very clear that an accused‘s silence per se does not warrant a conviction. It makes it clear that 
the absence of any evidence (either by the accused or other witnesses) during the defence‘s 
case is the actual meaning of ―if unrebutted or unexplained would warrant a conviction‖. I 
argue that this amendment would stop the heavy reliance on the principle in Balachandran‘s 
case that creates a misconception between RRS and the prima facie standard. Furthermore, it 
may also alert a vulnerable accused who intends to remain silent. He or she may reasonably 
expect the outcome of the choice. Currently, the law does not set out how to explain to the 
accused the consequences of electing to remain silent. This proposal may also help the court 
to find the correct terms to explain these consequences to the accused.  
 
E Summary 
 
On the surface, the concept of the presumption of innocence and the legal burden of proof in 
Malaysia is similar to overseas jurisdictions. However, the issue of how the burden is 
discharged to some extent varies from other jurisdictions. This is because, as discussed 
above, choosing to exercise the RRS  no longer functions as a protection to accused persons; 
it becomes a sword against them. Therefore, it is submitted that the RRS as it currently 
operates has little actual legal function in the Malaysian criminal justice system, and little 
value to the accused. It makes no sense for the accused in Malaysia to choose to remain silent 
at trial if that would warrant their conviction. In contrast, the right may still hold true in the 
other common law jurisdictions. In England and Wales, Australia, New Zealand and 
Singapore, although the law permits adverse inference and comment to be made, the court or 
the jury is not allowed to think that the failure to testify means the accused is guilty. The 
approaches taken by those jurisdictions are logical, having considered the nature of the right 
to protect against self-incrimination, and it preserves the true intention of the right.  
In my view, the interests of vulnerable accused need to be given some priority to ensure a fair 
process at trial. Nevertheless, the question that arises is: how does the right to remain silent 
actually assist the vulnerable accused during the trial? The answer is in the negative. Until the 
principle of the Federal Court in Balachandran is not overturned by courts of concurrent 
jurisdiction, as the law stands now that is how prima facie is determined in Malaysia. To take 
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away the right or to modify the character of the right to what it is being practised now might 
distract from the court‘s ability to determine prima facie. However, to allow the practice 
might infringe the concept of fairness in a criminal trial. Therefore, I submit that to 
recommend an adverse inference to be introduced in the Code might at least help to clear the 
muddy water. It could also persuade the courts to move away from the principle in 
Balachandran.  
After discussion is made on how the RUS and the RRS work in Malaysia, it is obvious that 
the Malaysian legislation is lacking in protections for vulnerable accused. However, the 
proposed reformation may resolve the problems. These recommendations may be useful for 
those vulnerable accused who either choose to give statement from the dock or to choose to 
say nothing at the defence stage.  In the next chapter, I discuss other potential protections that 
are worth considering by the Malaysian legislature, particularly for vulnerable accused who 
choose to give sworn evidence in court. I submit that one of the best ways to assist vulnerable 
accused in court is through an intermediary. I propose that an intermediary service for 
vulnerable accused be introduced in the Malaysian criminal justice system. 
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V Introduction of an Intermediary System for Vulnerable Accused in the 
Malaysian Criminal Trial 
 
In Chapters III and IV, I discussed how to improve the current protections to vulnerable 
accused who choose not to give a sworn evidence at trial, either through giving an unsworn 
statement or by remaining silent. Now, I turn to another possible protection for vulnerable 
accused who wish to give sworn testimony in court. The Malaysian criminal justice system 
provides for an intermediary service. However, this service is limited to a child witness, that 
is, a person under the age of sixteen (except for child offenders).
235
 There is no similar 
service provided to other vulnerable witnesses, including vulnerable accused. It is apparent 
that the function of the intermediary system is to protect a child witness or victim when 
giving evidence in court. It is unfortunate for the vulnerable accused in Malaysia that the 
absence of the application of the service to them in the legislation has denied them access to 
an intermediary. It causes the vulnerable accused to go through the same process as all other 
accused, including those who are not particularly vulnerable. I argue that an intermediary 
service should be made available to vulnerable accused persons. This could be one of the best 
approaches to effectively help the vulnerable accused who chooses to give evidence on oath 
in court. Since the intermediary system is not given a wide exposure in Malaysia, its 
characteristics are also not clearly known. For this reason, the use of the system in other 
Commonwealth countries is a useful starting point for discussion. 
Therefore, in Part A, I discuss the intermediary service in England and Wales and how it 
might help vulnerable accused. I analyse the function of an intermediary during a trial. In Part 
B, I examine the appropriate stage to identify a vulnerable person so that relevant assistance 
can be made available to him or her as soon as possible. In Part C, I highlight the arguments 
for and against an intermediary service. I discover that despite disapproval of the service by 
some scholars, the advantage it offers to vulnerable accused is appealing. However, before 
suggesting the service be introduced for the benefit of vulnerable accused in the Malaysian 
criminal proceedings, in Part D, I discuss whether it is practical to extend the service to 
vulnerable accused taking into account the cost it might incur. I found that it might be worth 
the money if this service is offered to vulnerable accused. Therefore, in Part E, I recommend 
that an intermediary service be offered to vulnerable accused who choose to give sworn 
evidence in court. I suggest reference to the legislation in England and Wales as a source of 
reference. 
A Intermediary Service for Vulnerable Accused 
 
Due to an awareness of the need to protect a vulnerable witness in court, the Home Office 
interdepartmental working group in England and Wales (hereinafter referred to as ―the 
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working group‖) recommended that a professionally trained intermediary should help 
disadvantaged children and adults in dealing with the courts.
236
 Vulnerable witnesses include 
―those with mental illness; all witnesses aged under 17; those with a physical disability or 
physical disorder and those with a learning disability.‖237 The law in England and Wales 
provides for assistance to the vulnerable witness (excluding the accused) during trial, as 
evident from the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, whereby special measures 
directions are provided for the purpose of assisting witnesses who meet the definition of a 
vulnerable witness under s 16.
238
 Such witnesses may apply to be examined through 
registered intermediaries.
239
 In order to ensure efficiency in providing services to vulnerable 
witnesses, a registered intermediary has to be a qualified and trained person with a 
psychology, speech and language therapy, social work, nursing or teaching background.
240
 
They are also accredited by the Ministry of Justice.
241
 Apart from that, impartiality is the 
most important criterion, as intermediaries work neither for the prosecution nor the 
defence.
242
 An intermediary may also be an interpreter approved by the court.
243
 Since the 
service involves testimony of the witness, an intermediary faces the same consequence as an 
interpreter if the former commits perjury.
244
 
 
This provision on intermediary in England and Wales is not available to an accused, since the 
accused is considered as having sufficient protection from the statute in addition to their 
rights in the common law and the European Convention of Human Rights.
245
 However, it is 
undeniable that some accused persons do have difficulties in testifying in court, just like other 
vulnerable witnesses.
246
 The same situation happens in Malaysia whereby the intermediary is 
available only for a child witness. An intermediary is not even allowed for a child offender, 
let alone adult vulnerable accused. This creates unfairness in the court process and raises the 
issue of inequality of arms. For some accused, particularly those who suffer from intellectual 
disability, court proceedings may be intimidating. Therefore, some judges and lawyers in 
England and Wales were of the view that such support should be made available to 
vulnerable accused as well as vulnerable witnesses.
247
 For this reason, there was an 
amendment in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (England and Wales) to allow a vulnerable 
accused person to get assistance from an intermediary.
248
 The application of the intermediary 
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service to the accused is well explained in s 104 of the Act. However, the legislation has yet 
to be enforced in England and Wales.
249
 Therefore, since the legislation regarding the 
intermediary service for the vulnerable accused is not being exercised in England and Wales 
at the moment, the court is invoking its inherent jurisdiction by appointing non-registered 
intermediaries to assist a vulnerable accused at trial whenever the situation warrants it in 
order to uphold the right to a fair trial.
250
 In addition, courts consider the importance of 
providing such assistance to vulnerable accused as it would help the accused to have more 
effective participation in the criminal trial. The case to illustrate the concern is R v Walls, 
where  Thomas LJ held that:
251
 
There are available to those with learning disabilities in this age, facilities that can assist. 
Consideration can now be given to the use of an intermediary under the court‘s inherent 
powers as described in the Sevenoaks case, pending the bringing into force of s.33BA (3) 
and (4) of the Youth and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (added by the Coroners and Justice 
Act 2009). Plainly consideration should be given to the use of these powers or other 
ways in which the characteristics of a defendant evident from a psychological or 
psychiatric report can be accommodated with the trial process so that his limitations can 
be understood by the jury, before a court takes the very significant step of embarking on 
a trial of fitness to plead. 
1 Function of an intermediary in court 
 
The function of an intermediary in court is to communicate and interpret the questions put to 
the witness by counsel and ―repeating the answer given by the witness back to the court.‖252 
Some argue that the function of an intermediary is restricted to communicating the questions 
and the answers to the court and is not to highlight to the court any questions that they would 
think inappropriate.
253
 This is because it is the duty of the judge to determine whether the 
questioning during cross-examination is suitable or not, and to grant such a role to the 
intermediary would lead to a conflict in the theory of the adversarial trial process.
254
  
 
Concern has also been raised that since the obligations to determine improper questions still 
rest on the shoulders of the judge or counsel, in a proceeding involving intermediaries the 
judge or the counsel is less willing to interfere with the proceedings when improper questions 
are asked.
255
 This would therefore be to the disadvantage of the witness/accused.
256
 However, 
there are different opinions on this issue. Empirical research on questioning witnesses with 
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disabilities shows that most lawyers do not change the pattern of their questions for disabled 
witnesses.
257
 The situation is even more troubling during the cross-examination process.
258
 
This is because a person with disabilities is thought to be more likely to agree with leading 
questions, compared with a person without any disabilities.
259
 Furthermore, some scholars 
have claimed a registered intermediary may serve to alert the court to particular questions in 
cross-examination that are not appropriate to the vulnerable witness, and which the judge 
may not have recognised as inappropriate otherwise.
260
 In my view, it is proper that an 
intermediary should be allowed to interfere when the questions asked are inappropriate, since 
it would be one of the purposes of having the intermediary in court. If the function of an 
intermediary is restricted to communicating the questions and answers, then the role would 
not be dissimilar to a court interpreter, and the special expertise of the intermediary would not 
be taken full advantage of.  
 
In New Zealand, even though there is no express legislative provision regarding an 
intermediary service for vulnerable accused,
 261
 the court has the discretion to allow such 
assistance if the situation warrants it. This is seen in the case of R v Kaukasi when the court 
accepted a recommendation to use special measures when dealing with a vulnerable accused 
and modified the trial procedure to minimise the stress that a vulnerable accused might have 
faced during the trial process.
262
 The approach in Kaukasi‗s case has become a useful guide 
to succeeding cases in meeting the needs of vulnerable accused.
263
 
It is prudent to venture into the service provided by an intermediary more deeply. Besides 
assisting vulnerable accused at trial, the service is also very useful for the vulnerable person 
pre-trial. I now turn to discuss the possibility of having an intermediary as early as during the 
police investigation. 
 
B How Early should an Intermediary be Available to a Vulnerable Accused? 
 
Studies show that the role of a registered intermediary can start as early as at the stage of 
police interview in order to identify a vulnerable suspect who would later become a 
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vulnerable accused in a court of law.
264
 In England and Wales, although the special measures 
directions might be considered a successful step in assisting vulnerable and intimidated 
witnesses, improvement is still needed, especially in terms of the police and the prosecution 
identifying a witness that requires such assistance as early as possible.
265
 The approach to 
assisting vulnerable accused becomes more effective if this type of accused is identified at an 
early stage of proceedings, for example during the police interviews. Studies have also shown 
that a person with mental/learning disability often does not get assistance either at the stage 
of police investigation or of prosecution due to the failure of the police to recognise the 
problem.
266
 The vulnerability of an accused person could also be identified by his or her own 
counsel. Counsel could later inform the police about the need to provide appropriate 
assistance. However, it is undeniable that it is difficult for the police to recognise an accused 
of this category.
267
 Some of the reasons this is happening are the ―lack of training for 
professionals in the criminal justice system; and a lack of time to identify vulnerable 
offenders.‖268 
One of the questions that would help the police in the task is, ―Where did the witness go to 
school?‖269 However, though such a question may give some guidance in identifying 
vulnerable accused, it is doubtful that it would ease the burden as children with learning 
disabilities are now given more opportunities to join mainstream schools rather than attending 
schools with special services.
270
 This will make the task more difficult for the police. Even 
though the law allows the vulnerable suspect in England and Wales to be accompanied by an 
―Appropriate Adult‖ during the interview (e.g. parents who are not involved in the crime in 
question),
271
 that is more in the nature of ―a supportive role rather than the role of a 
communication expert‖, especially for vulnerable suspects.272 Although the presence of an 
Appropriate Adult does have an effective impact on the behaviour of police and lawyers 
during the police interview, for a better effect, it is important for an Appropriate Adult to 
participate more actively during the interview and to interfere when it is necessary.
273
 For this 
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to happen, a professionally trained Appropriate Adult is needed so that he or she can 
intervene when comprehension of questions or language is an issue.
274
  
However, besides having assistance from intermediaries, there is also a suggestion that the 
police caution should be made simpler and more understandable to the accused, especially 
accused with disabilities.
275
 Furthermore, the line of questioning by defence counsel during 
the cross-examination should be made less complex and more directly to the point,
276
 which 
is a fair suggestion for the benefit of a vulnerable accused. However, to suggest 
straightforward questions in cross-examination generally would benefit an accused without 
any disabilities. Hence, it may not be just to counsel, since cross-examination is the most 
effective weapon in a trial to shake the opponent‘s case in a trial.  
Next, I analyse the views for and against the intermediary service. 
 
C Diversity of Views on the Intermediary Service 
 
An intermediary service does not receive total support from scholars. They form different 
views on the effectiveness of intermediaries in criminal proceedings. In this part, I examine 
the variety of opinions on this issue to determine the extent to which the service is desirable 
for vulnerable accused in Malaysians criminal courts. 
1 Arguments for the intermediary service 
 
Having an intermediary available to vulnerable accused could eliminate a perception of 
inequality of arms in a criminal trial. Besides, the use of an intermediary might make it easier 
for the accused to give evidence in court in the same way as it helps witnesses for the same 
purpose. This is because the intermediary might use a softer tone of voice to the accused 
when communicating the questions put to him or her by the prosecution during cross-
examination.
277
 The availability of an intermediary may also help parties in the proceedings 
other than the accused, because the task of explaining a question to a vulnerable accused with 
mental impairment might be daunting to the counsel or the judge. Therefore, with the right 
technique and expertise, an intermediary might actually expedite the process of questioning 
in court rather than confirming negative perceptions that an intermediary might contribute to 
delays in the court process. 
The other advantage that the intermediary system may offer is that it could boost the self-
esteem of the accused and this might improve the criminal justice system as the accused 
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could testify with confidence in court. This is seen from the experience shared by O‘Mahony 
when he mentioned:
278
 
 
…it appears that the defendant may have gained confidence from the support of an 
intermediary standing in the witness box beside her and that she began to understand my 
role in intervening and requesting breaks which in turn led to her asserting her needs. 
 
A good justice system is important to guarantee an accused of a fair trial.
279
 Louise Ellison 
explained that the report by the working group shows that the advantage of having a 
registered intermediary is that it ―would improve the quality of the evidence received, save 
court time and diffuse the pressure of cross-examination on vulnerable witnesses.‖280 
Therefore, it might be suggested that the same advantage would be applicable to the accused 
if the assistance of the intermediary is extended to a vulnerable accused. This helps to achieve 
a more effective court process. The impartiality of the intermediary in assisting the 
communication between the defendant and the defence counsel might not be an issue as the 
communications are protected because the meeting is subject to legal privilege.
281
  
2 Arguments against the intermediary service 
 
However, some do not observe the service as positive. There is an argument that the 
existence of an intermediary might disturb the art of cross-examination, as the intermediary 
might advise the prosecution against asking leading questions of the vulnerable accused.
282
 
Further, the intermediary could cause the contact between the prosecutor and the accused to 
become indirect and could eventually prevent the prosecution from exercising an efficient 
cross-examination.
283
 Even though it may not seem fair, since leading questions are the heart 
of cross-examination because that is where the case of one party could be strengthened, it 
should not be overlooked that vulnerable people with learning disabilities are the type of 
people who normally are confused easily and who are likely eventually to agree with leading 
questions.
284
 Therefore, their answers to the questions may not represent the truth, due to 
difficulty in coping with the cross-examination process. Furthermore such questions would 
contain ―developmentally inappropriate language and interrogative devices better suited to 
obfuscation, intimidation and coercion than effective ‗testing‘ of evidence.‖285 Therefore, it 
may be submitted that the existence of a registered intermediary would assist a vulnerable 
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accused against the abuse of cross-examination. Furthermore, the service would not deviate 
from an adversarial system since the intermediary is not allowed to form his or her own 
questions but merely to clarify and explain the questions in simple language which can be 
better understood by the vulnerable accused.
286
  
There is also the issue that this service might have negative ramifications for the 
intermediaries themselves, as they might have to attend a lengthy trial, especially when the 
judge demands the intermediaries be in court throughout the trial. Furthermore, unlike 
registered intermediaries, non-registered intermediaries consist of untrained individuals 
(professional or not) who have no accreditation from the Ministry of Justice.
287
 Therefore, 
there are concerns whether the quality of the services provided to vulnerable accused is at the 
same level as the quality of services provided to vulnerable witnesses through registered 
intermediaries.
288
 
 
Although the English statute is not yet enforced, debates on its application have arisen. There 
are arguments on what would happen to the vulnerable accused throughout the trial since the 
statute provides for the service of intermediaries only during the giving of evidence in 
court.
289
 However, judges in some cases prefer the service to be available for the rest of the 
proceedings.
290
 Hence, it leads to a question: would that practice remain when the statute is 
implemented?
291
 This is similar to the situation in Malaysia. The intermediary service in the 
Malaysian Evidence of Child Witness Act 2007 provides for the service only during 
examination of the child. I submit that concern regarding this matter is justifiable, as it is 
important to ensure that the vulnerable accused understands the proceedings from beginning 
to the end. However, the fact that the legislation is not drafted in such a way as to allow the 
intermediaries to accompany the accused throughout the entire trial may also have reasonable 
grounds. The service of an intermediary may not only be costly but also takes time. The 
crucial part in a trial proceeding for a vulnerable accused is during testimony. Therefore, to 
have an intermediary during that process is sufficient as far as a fair trial concept is 
concerned. Suppose a trial lasts for five days and the accused gives evidence during the third 
day of the proceeding; retaining intermediaries for the remaining days may not be effective in 
terms of the concept of the intermediary system itself. It might be better if the intermediary 
were available for other vulnerable accused who would need the service instead.  
 
Regardless of the dissenting views on the intermediary service, I submit that the service 
sounds promising for vulnerable accused. Hence, the same approach should be considered by 
the Malaysian criminal justice system. This is because it is evident from the existing law and 
procedures that such assistance to a vulnerable accused is wanting. However, it is important 
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to identify whether the service is relevant or not to Malaysia. For this reason, I discuss the 
practicality of introducing the intermediary service to vulnerable accused in the Malaysian 
criminal justice system.    
D Is the Intermediary Service Practical in Malaysia? 
 
Before the service of registered intermediaries was used across England and Wales, a pilot 
study on the effectiveness of the service was conducted in six different places in England and 
Wales.
292
 It may be suggested that the same approach could be taken by the Malaysian 
criminal system to find out how far the idea suits the criminal justice system in the country. 
To introduce this system might be costly and thorough research as to its practicality in 
Malaysia is worthwhile. For this purpose, the research conducted by Elisabeth McDonald and 
Yvette Tinsley on the practicality of the intermediary system is useful.
293
 They have set out 
the obstacles that may exist if this system is implemented. The use of intermediaries may 
delay the trial process as the witnesses may take a longer time than they usually do when 
giving evidence.
294
 This may happen because the intermediaries may take time to ensure the 
accused understands the questions. The possible delay that could be perceived when using 
such a service in the court trial is, the intermediaries may advise or request the court to have 
regular breaks during the process or the trial might need to be adjourned early because the 
accused is exhausted by the process.
295
 From a different perspective, if an intermediary is 
given greater responsibility in relation to questioned asked, there would be a risk that such 
questions are not presented as they should have been, and this could lead to the possibility of 
appeal.
296
 These are justifiable concerns that should be given due attention. I argue that the 
aim of introducing a better justice system is to benefit all parties in criminal proceedings and 
not to deprive anyone of a fair trial. This includes the vulnerable accused. It may not do 
justice to vulnerable accused if they are refused relevant assistance on the ground that it will 
be time consuming. I also argue that this might not be a usual event in court, since this is a 
specific service for selected accused only. 
In considering whether an intermediary service is practical or not in New Zealand, the issue 
of jurisdiction was raised. There was a concern that the implementation of the intermediary 
system in New Zealand may be an issue in terms of training sufficient intermediaries, as the 
jurisdiction is small.
297
 To relate this problem to the Malaysian context, it is useful to discuss 
the issue geographically. Malaysia comprises thirteen states and the federal territories of 
Kuala Lumpur, Putrajaya and Labuan.
298
 Malaysia has a population of 28.3 million as at 
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2010,
299
 while the population of New Zealand was 4,405,200 million as at 2011.
300
 In 
Malaysia the important legislation relevant to the proposed reform, namely the Criminal 
Procedure Code and the Evidence Act 1950, are federal law and therefore applicable to all the 
states and all ethnic communities.
301
 In addition, it may be argued that the larger the 
population, the more crime likely to happen.  Another potential problem of using this system 
concerns the perception of the jury and how their decision-making might be affected when an 
intermediary sits next to the accused in the dock.
302
 I submit that this might not raise alarm in 
Malaysia, since it has no jury system and the judge is a sole decision maker. Therefore, the 
system could be more practical in Malaysia and the money and time spent to recruit 
professional intermediaries might be well worth while.  
I also argue that even though the Code provides for the services of an interpreter,
303
 it merely 
offers help to an accused or witness who does not speak or understand the Malay language, as 
Malay is the official language of the court in Malaysia.
304
 The interpreter has no 
responsibility to go beyond that, i.e. to determine the accused‘s intellectual comprehension of 
the proceedings. Interpreters do not have the expertise to deal with vulnerable accused, who 
may not only have difficulty with translation from one language to another, but with more 
fundamental aspects of questions. Intermediaries are skilled in assisting vulnerable accused 
with more serious conditions to cope with the court‘s processes better. Similarly, in New 
Zealand the Evidence Act 2006 allows for ―communication assistance.‖305 This is in 
compliance with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
306
 Nevertheless, the application of 
the assistance is limited to communication disabilities, for example those who have difficulty 
in understanding the questions. Therefore, there are recommendations that the interpretation 
of the term ―communication assistance‖ in the New Zealand Evidence Act 2006 to be 
amended so that the assistance is available not only to those who have language barriers or a 
communication disability as defined under the law,
307
 but also includes witnesses or accused 
who might have difficulty in grasping the meaning of the questions put to them.
308
  
Hence, the discussion in this section obviously shows the necessity of having proper 
communication aids for vulnerable accused who may have difficulty in understanding the 
court process in Malaysia. I therefore suggest that an intermediary may be the perfect role for 
this purpose.  
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Next, I make recommendations for an intermediary service in Malaysia. 
 
E Recommendations: Introduce an Intermediary Service to Vulnerable Accused who 
Choose to give Sworn Evidence in the Malaysian Criminal Trials 
 
The intermediary system is one of the best assistance and worthy of consideration. This 
system is not new in Malaysia since it is available specifically to child witnesses. Therefore it 
is apparent that trained people in this field are available (although they may have specialised 
in working with children) and it is only a matter of expanding their services to vulnerable 
accused with some relevant training. Therefore, to provide a better criminal justice system, I 
recommend introducing an intermediary service for vulnerable accused in Malaysia. 
1 Recommendation 1 
 
For the detailed characteristics of the intermediary system, this dissertation proposes to 
follow the provision as found in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009
309
 in England and Wales, 
but with some modifications. The reason this particular statute is referred to, instead of s 8 of 
the Malaysian Evidence of Child Witness Act 2007  that deals with the provision of an 
intermediary, is because the former explains explicitly how the duties of an intermediary for 
an accused should be carried out. The proposed new provision could be incorporated under 
chapter XXIV of the Malaysian Criminal Procedure Code, which deals with the general 
provisions of inquiries and trials. It is also suggested that the new provision be inserted after 
the discussion regarding an accused who does not understand proceedings in s 258. The 
proposed provision is as follows:- 
Section 258A Examination of accused through intermediary 
(1) This section applies to any proceedings (whether in a magistrates' court or before the 
High Court) against a person for an offence.  
(2) The court may, on the application of the accused, give a direction under subsection (3) if it 
is satisfied—  
(a) that the conditions in section 2 of the Code are met in relation to a vulnerable 
person, and  
(b) that making the direction is necessary in order to ensure that the accused receives 
a fair trial.  
(3) A direction under this subsection is a direction that provides for any examination of the 
accused to be conducted through an interpreter or other person approved by the court for the 
purposes of this section (―an intermediary‖).  
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(4) The function of an intermediary is to communicate—  
(a) to the accused, questions put to the accused, and  
(b) to any person asking such questions, the answers given by the accused in reply to 
them,  
and to explain such questions or answers so far as necessary to enable them to be understood 
by the accused or the person in question.  
(5) Any examination of the accused in pursuance of a direction under subsection (3) must take 
place in the presence of such persons and in circumstances in which—  
(a) the judge or justices (or both) and legal representatives acting in the proceedings 
are able to see and hear the examination of the accused and to communicate with the 
intermediary,  
(b) where there are two or more accused in the proceedings, each of the other accused 
is able to see and hear the examination of the accused.  
For the purposes of this subsection any impairment of eyesight or hearing is to be 
disregarded.  
(6) Where two or more legal representatives are acting for a party to the proceedings, 
subsection (5)(a) is to be regarded as satisfied in relation to those representatives if at all 
material times it is satisfied in relation to at least one of them.  
(7) A person may not act as an intermediary in a particular case except after making a 
declaration, that the person will faithfully perform the function of an intermediary.  
(8) Section 191 of the Penal Code (giving false evidence) applies in relation to a person 
acting as an intermediary as it applies in relation to a person lawfully sworn as an interpreter 
in a judicial proceeding 
 
The modifications are as highlighted to accord with the Malaysian situation. The omission of 
subsection (5) and (6) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 is suggested because those 
subsections discuss the conditions of accused who may be eligible for intermediary 
assistance. However, this dissertation has suggested that the eligibility of the accused to use 
the service in Malaysia is determined by whether an accused falls under the definition of 
―vulnerable person‖ of the suggested provision in the Code as discussed in Chapter II of this 
dissertation.  
2 Recommendation 2 
 
My dissertation also proposes an additional provision be introduced in Malaysia. It is a 
provision as to how to identify vulnerable person who deserve the service of an intermediary. 
This has been an issue in England and Wales and there are views that it is useful to help the 
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vulnerable accused at an early stage; at the investigation process.
310
 This would prevent 
unfairness to the vulnerable accused who is not identified sooner and eventually has to go 
through the same procedures as a normal accused. This dissertation proposes that the new 
provision should be inserted after s 112 of the Code, which deals with the examination of 
witnesses by the police. I argue that this proposal is in line with the proposed s 2 of the Code 
since it also deals with a witness who is vulnerable.
311
 The proposed new provision is as 
follows: 
Section 112A Examination of witnesses by police in the presence of an intermediary. 
(1) A person who falls under the definition of vulnerable person for the purpose of this Code 
is allowed to be examined by the police in the presence of an intermediary. 
(2) Application for an intermediary may be made by the person or the person‘s counsel or a 
police officer of that police station 
 
F Possible Benefit from the Amendment 
 
If the Code is amended to allow an intermediary service to a vulnerable accused, I argue it 
helps the criminal justice system in Malaysia become more sound and fair. This is because to 
leave the vulnerable accused in court without proper assistance is highly prejudicial to them. 
They may not understand the court process as much as an accused without any disabilities 
would. Furthermore, the presence of an intermediary during the trial process would have a 
positive impact on the court and the prosecution. This is because they have no expertise to 
deal with accused with vulnerability. Therefore, it may be difficult for them to handle the 
situation if the accused becomes uncontrollable. In addition, it may also reduce the incidence 
of miscarriage of justice since there would be no fear that the vulnerable accused suffered 
from any mistreatment during the trial process. I also submit that a greater justice is served to 
the vulnerable accused/witness when a proper assistance is provided to them as early as at the 
stage of police investigation. 
G Summary 
 
I argue that the potential of an intermediary in Malaysia is not fully discovered. The reason is 
that it is apparent from the discussion above that this service is in fact available but is limited 
only to child witnesses. Therefore, I suggest that this service is also relevant to accused who 
are vulnerable, as is seen by other jurisdictions. It is time for the Malaysian legislature to be 
more active in protecting the interest of vulnerable accused, and one way to do so is to allow 
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an intermediary service for vulnerable accused. To this effect, I suggested in this Chapter that 
the Code be amended to allow an intermediary service for vulnerable accused/suspects pre-
trial and during trial. 
Besides providing physical assistance to vulnerable accused, it is also important to make sure 
the psychological aspects of the accused are well taken care of. This is because vulnerable 
accused may be more comfortable to go through the court process with adequate support. 
Hence, in the next Chapter I propose that a support person be made available to vulnerable 
accused, if the court thinks it is proper. 
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VI  Other Modes of Assistance: Support Persons 
 
A vulnerable accused may not only physically but also emotionally and mentally fragile. The 
provision of useful assistance to address this issue may be beneficial not only to the accused, 
but also to everyone involved in the court proceedings. This is because it may help the 
smooth running of the court trial. Therefore, in this Chapter, I discuss emotional assistance to 
vulnerable accused through a support person. The presence of a support person may help the 
vulnerable accused to be more comfortable during the court proceedings.  
In Part A, I discuss the functions of a support person and how such a person may help the 
vulnerable accused. I also explain that a rather similar assistance is also available in Malaysia 
but it only benefits the child witness. Due to the benefits that could be derived from this 
assistance in terms of emotional support to vulnerable accused, in Part B I propose a 
provision on support persons for vulnerable accused that I recommend be inserted into the 
Code.  
 
A Support Persons 
 
The law in New Zealand allows a support person to accompany a complainant or a witness 
when giving evidence in court.
312
 The provision of a support person may be extended to an 
accused with the permission of the judge.
313
 Although the function of the support person is 
not very different from the role of an Appropriate Adult as available in England and Wales, 
the difference is that for the latter, such assistance is for a suspect pre-trial. Meanwhile, in 
New Zealand, the role of support persons is rather concerned with supporting the emotional 
and psychological well-being of a vulnerable witness or accused at trial. This may create a 
more comfortable environment for them when giving evidence in court. Nevertheless, the 
support person is not allowed to interfere during the trial process. The role of a support 
person is well-defined by the New Zealand Law Commission as:
314
 
The function of a support person is solely to help reduce stress or trauma for the witness and 
does not include giving advice or prompting. A support person cannot take the role of a 
McKenzie friend – that is, provide advice or assistance in court to an unrepresented litigant, 
as such assistance goes beyond mere support. A support person should not speak with the 
witness unless the judge gives permission. 
A quite similar provision is also seen in New South Wales, Australia. Its Criminal Procedure 
Act 1986 also provides for a support person to be present when a vulnerable person in giving 
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evidence in court.
315
 I submit that the law in Malaysia does provide for a presence of an adult 
as company in any of the proceedings, but it is only applicable to a child witness.
316
 As with 
the intermediary service, this assistance is also not allowed for child accused.
317
 I submit that 
this situation is not surprising because if very little attention is given to the physical needs of 
the vulnerable accused at trial, then it might be difficult to expect the justice system to 
provide for emotional support for them. Even though the statute in Malaysia does not use the 
word ―support person‖ or ―Appropriate Adult‖, the role of the adult mentioned in the 
provision is similar; to make the child witness more comfortable when giving evidence in 
court. I also argue that the support of an adult should also be extended to a vulnerable 
accused. This is because accused of this nature often have trust issues. They may be 
comfortable only when around people they are used to. To have an adult close to them during 
the trial process may at least give a sense of comfort to them. Therefore, I find this assistance 
is very useful towards their emotional well-being. 
The reason I consider it is useful to introduce a support person into the Malaysian legislation 
is because, even though the court would allow an intermediary to assist the vulnerable 
accused in the trial process (if the law is amended accordingly), that function does no more 
than ensure the questions are put in a manner that can be understood by the vulnerable 
accused. Furthermore, there may be a trust issue since the accused does not know the parties 
involved in the proceedings. To have someone who is close to the accused and allowed to sit 
next to them might help them to settle more calmly in the proceedings. This is a fair 
approach.  
 
B Recommendation: Provision for Support Persons 
 
It is time for  Malaysian criminal justice to consider reform in its justice system to include a 
support person in criminal proceedings. Vulnerable accused persons need do not only 
physical assistance, but also psychological assistance. These accused come from different 
backgrounds from normal individuals. They may have trust issues that can be overcome only 
by having persons that they are comfortable with around them. However, my dissertation 
does not suggest that every vulnerable accused needs such help. This support person should 
be available only to accused who need psychological support.  
Since quite similar support is available in s 9 of the Evidence of Child Witness Act 2007 in 
Malaysia, I submit that the proposed provision for the accused in the Code should follow that 
source. However, some modifications of the provision will be made by making reference to s 
79 of the New Zealand Evidence Act 2006 and s 306ZK of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 
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of New South Wales. These are good combinations of legislation to achieve an effective 
provision regarding a support person. Section 9(3) of the Evidence of Child Witness Act 
2007 explains clearly the restriction to the support person when accompanying a child 
witness in court. The New Zealand law states only generally that the court will give 
directions on how this support person operates. However, the requirement to disclose the 
information of the support person to all the parties involved, as required by the New Zealand 
law in s 79(4), is absent in the Malaysian law. I further suggest application of the requirement 
in s 306ZK (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 in New South Wales because that 
subsection explains explicitly that vulnerable persons are permitted to choose who is the 
support person that they would like to accompany them. Rationally, a support person has to 
be someone that the vulnerable persons are comfortable to be with, hence by making it clear 
in the statute that the choice is the vulnerable person‘s, is a good approach. This newly 
proposed provision may be known as s 258B of the Code. Therefore, taking into account all 
the necessary elements of the provision, I propose the new provision as follows:   
 Section 258B Support persons 
(1) The Court may allow a vulnerable person to be accompanied by a support person while 
giving evidence in any proceedings. 
(2) The Court may permit more than one support person to accompany the vulnerable 
person if the Court considers it in the interests of justice to do so. 
(3) A vulnerable person who gives evidence in a proceeding to which this section applies 
is entitled to choose a person whom the vulnerable person would like to have present 
near him or her when giving evidence.  
 
(4)  A support person accompanying the vulnerable person shall not— 
(a) prompt the vulnerable person to answer any question; 
(b) influence the answers of the vulnerable person ; or 
(c) disrupt the questioning of the vulnerable person. 
 
(5) Despite subsections (1) and (2), the Court may, in the interest of justice, direct that 
support may not be provided to a vulnerable person by— 
(a) any person; or 
(b) a particular person. 
 
(6) A vulnerable person who is to have a support person near him or her while  giving 
evidence must, unless the Court orders otherwise, disclose to all parties as soon as 
practicable the name of each person who is to provide that support. 
The modifications from s 9 of the Malaysian Evidence of Child Witness Act 2007 are as 
highlighted.  Since I suggest this provision should be inserted into the Code, the words ―child 
witness‖ in the original provision will be replaced with the words ―vulnerable person‖ for the 
purpose of the Code. Meanwhile the word ―adults‖ will be replaced with the words ―support 
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person‖. It may be a good approach if the proper term is introduced into the statute. I submit 
that if the provision is amended to replace the words ―an adult‖ with ―support person‖, it may 
have a better impact on the provision. The term ―support person‖ is self-explanatory of its 
function, while ―an adult‖ is rather vague. The elements that I proposed in this provision 
would ensure that justice is served to other parties in the proceeding as well. This is because, 
as seen in subsection (6), the other parties will have knowledge of who is the support person 
allowed by the court to accompany the vulnerable accused. Furthermore, the functions as 
mentioned in subsection (4) do not allow any participation or influence over evidence given. 
In addition, even though subsection (3) gives permission to the vulnerable person to choose 
the support person to be with them while giving evidence, subsection (5) gives wide power to 
the court to eliminate a support person if the court believes, in the interest of justice that there 
is an abuse of the process by the support person or the vulnerable person.
318
  
 
C Possible Benefit from the Amendment 
 
It may not be too overstated to submit that a support person is the most important assistance a 
vulnerable accused would wish for. The environment in a criminal trial proceeding can be 
very intimidating. The presence of a support person may build a vulnerable person‘s 
confidence in the trial process. This may make things a lot easier for the other parties in the 
proceedings as well since, when a vulnerable accused is calm and confident, the questioning 
process may also be trouble-free. This allows the parties to focus on their own duties rather 
than be concerned with the accused‘s unstable emotions. 
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VII Conclusion 
 
As discussed above, it is apparent that relevant methods of assistance for vulnerable 
witnesses are available in the Malaysian criminal justice system. However, the scope of the 
assistance is very narrow, and focuses only on child witnesses. It is an undeniable fact that a 
child is vulnerable and requires protection, but there are other groups of people that fall 
within the same category of vulnerability. This might include an accused person. The failure 
of the justice system to recognise the need to provided extra assistance to a vulnerable 
accused occurs because of a lack of understanding of the definition of a vulnerable accused 
person in Malaysia. I argue that if there is awareness by the relevant authorities to address 
this issue, there are great possibilities for the relevant assistance to be provided to vulnerable 
accused. Therefore, after discussing the laws in other Commonwealth jurisdictions in respect 
of the protections available to the disadvantaged and vulnerable accused in a criminal trial, it 
is clear that there are flaws in Malaysian law, which is therefore in need of review. Not only 
are some laws and procedures lacking compliance with overseas approaches, but I consider 
that they are also unfair and out-dated.  
The RUS and RRS provided in the Malaysian laws are no longer relevant in the way they are 
utilised currently. The general application of the RUS has caused the right to become abused 
by irresponsible accused. Meanwhile, automatic conviction if the accused chooses to remain 
silent as provided for by the law is actually undermining the spirit of the right. Evidently, this 
situation is suppressing an accused who is vulnerable. Therefore, in order to produce a better 
justice system and to provide fairness to less fortunate accused, amendments to the law in 
Malaysia are crucial. 
To remedy the situation, I propose the definition of the term ―vulnerable person‖ is clearly 
spelled out in s 2 of the Code. This amendment might highlight the need to provide further 
relevant assistance for vulnerable accused in the future. My dissertation also proposes that the 
RUS is retained in Malaysia but the characteristics of the right should be modified to suit the 
current practice. It is proposed that the unsworn statement should only be available to a 
vulnerable person who demonstrates he or she might have difficulty in engaging with the 
court process. I propose a new provision be inserted into the Malaysian Evidence Act 1950 to 
incorporate the conditions that have to be fulfilled by the accused before an unsworn 
statement can be made in court. This new provision is known as s 118A. In addition, s 3 of 
the Evidence Act 1950 needs be amended to clarify that the unsworn statement falls within 
the meaning of evidence. This could have a positive contribution to the law of evidence in 
Malaysia since it might resolve the debate regarding the evidential value of the unsworn 
statement. I further recommend the amendment of s 173(ha)(ii) of the Code to apply the 
restriction clearly to the application of the RUS. This amendment could also expedite the 
disposal of criminal cases since judges could exercise their judicial time more effectively. 
This might happen because the application of the RUS is limited. Currently, Malaysian 
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judges have no choice but to allow any accused person to give an unsworn statement if he or 
she chooses to do so. This could lead to a backlog of cases in Malaysian criminal court since 
time has to be spent hearing the statement from the dock, which could take hours of the 
court‘s time. A limitation of the RUS to those who are vulnerable, and putting beyond doubt 
its status as evidence, will act to rectify some of the efficiency issues resulting from the 
operation of what is now a broad, uncertain right.  
I also propose s 173(ha)(iii) of the Code be amended by the insertion of a proviso for adverse 
inference. This will allow the court to give proper warning to the accused, particularly 
vulnerable accused, of the effect of remaining silent during trial. I suggest this is a fair 
approach since the accused is alerted to the outcome of the choice that he or she makes.  
It is further recommended that an intermediary service be introduced into the Code for 
vulnerable accused who choose to give sworn evidence in court. This is a practical method 
since it might allow the vulnerable accused to give evidence in a proper manner. For this 
reason, I recommend the insertion of a new provision known as s 258A to allow intermediary 
assistance to vulnerable accused during trial. I also suggest the inclusion of a provision for 
intermediary assistance during police investigations in s 112A of the Code. This is to ensure a 
vulnerable person receives appropriate treatment throughout the process. Then, I also propose 
a support person be available for the vulnerable accused at trial, should the accused so wish. 
This is important because some vulnerable accused suffer from emotional and psychological 
disorders. To have someone that they can trust may help them to cope better in court.  The 
new provision is to be inserted after the provision that deals with an intermediary service in 
the Code. It is known as s 258B of the Code.   
It is an indisputable fact that disadvantaged and vulnerable accused will feel intimidated by 
legal procedures no matter how detailed the legislation that is drafted to protect their 
interests.
319
 Therefore, no matter how well a law is drafted, it can never be perfect. However, 
the recommendations in this dissertation might help to produce a better criminal justice 
system in Malaysia. This is important, since it cannot be denied that the resources available to 
the prosecution outweigh those available to the defence.
320
 Hence, the reforms I suggest 
could at least minimise the inequality of arms between the prosecution and the accused. 
Although a man-made law can never be perfect, a sound and justifiable law is close to 
perfection in the eyes of the people. Hence, it is the basic aim of this dissertation to humbly 
propose amendments to the Malaysian law to provide more efficient and effective rights to 
the vulnerable accused, who deserve to be treated fairly by the law. Lord Woolf CJ 
explains:
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At the heart of our criminal justice system is the principle that while it is important that justice 
is done to the prosecution and justice is done to the victim, in the final analysis the fact 
remains that it is even more important that an injustice is not done to a defendant. It is central 
to the way we administer justice in this country that although it may mean that some guilty 
people go unpunished, it is more important that the innocent are not wrongly convicted. 
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Appendix (Statutory Suggestions According to Chapters) 
 
II      Vulnerable Person in the Context of Criminal Trial 
A        Malaysian Criminal Procedure Code 
          Section 2.  Interpretation 
(2) In this Code- 
 
"vulnerable person" means a witness or accused person who is a child or cognitively 
impaired of any age. For the purpose of this Code, a ―cognitive impairment‖ includes 
any of the following:  
(a) an intellectual disability,  
(b) a developmental disorder (including an autistic spectrum disorder),  
(c) a neurological disorder,  
(d) dementia,  
(e) a mental disorder(has the same meaning as s 2 of the Mental Health Act 2001), 
(f) a brain injury.  
 
III      Current Protection: A Critical Analysis of the Rights to give an Unsworn 
Statement in Malaysian Criminal Trials 
A         Malaysian Evidence Act 1950 
           Section 3. Interpretation 
―evidence‖ includes— 
(a) all statements, including an unsworn statement, which the court permits or 
requires to be made before it by witnesses in relation to matters of fact under inquiry: 
such statements are called oral evidence; 
(b) all documents produced for the inspection of the court: such documents are called 
documentary evidence; 
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Section 118A 
Reception of unsworn statement. 
(1)Subsections (2) and (3) apply to a person (of any age)who— 
     (a)is competent to give evidence in criminal proceedings, but  
(b)by virtue of section 118 is not permitted to be sworn for the purpose of 
giving evidence on oath in such proceedings or  who falls within the meaning 
of a vulnerable person in s 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code.  
(2)The statement in criminal proceedings of a person to whom this subsection 
applies shall be given unsworn from the dock and no cross-examination is 
allowed. 
(3)A deposition of unsworn statement given by a person to whom this subsection 
applies may be taken for the purposes of criminal proceedings as if that statement 
had been given on oath.  
(4)A court in criminal proceedings shall accordingly receive in evidence any 
statement given unsworn in pursuance of subsection (2) or (3).  
(5)Where a person (―the witness‖) who is competent to give evidence in criminal 
proceedings gives a statement in such proceedings unsworn, no conviction, a 
verdict or finding in those proceedings shall be taken to be unsafe for the purpose 
of sections 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code (procedure for appeal) by reason 
only that it appears to the Appellate Court that the witness was a person competent 
to testify section 118 (and should accordingly have given his evidence on oath).  
 
            Section 118B 
Penalty for giving false unsworn statement 
(1)If such a person wilfully gives false statement in such circumstances that, had 
the evidence been given on oath, he would have been guilty of perjury, he shall be 
guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction under s 14 of the Oaths and 
Affirmations Act 1949.  
 
B        Malaysian Criminal Procedure Code 
Section 173. Procedure in summary trials. 
 The following procedure shall be observed by Magistrates in summary trials: 
(ha)When the Court calls upon the accused to enter on his defence under 
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subparagraph (h)(i), the Court shall read and explain the three options to the 
accused which are as follows: 
(i)to give sworn evidence in the witness box;  
(ii)to give unsworn statement from the dock (subject to the conditions set 
out in section 118 of the Evidence Act); or 
(iii)to remain silent. 
 
IV      Current Protection: Right to Remain Silent 
A       Malaysian Criminal Procedure Code 
 
          Section 173(ha) 
 
          (iii) to remain silent. 
―if you elect not to give evidence in the witness box, that is to say, remain silent, then 
I must tell you that the court in deciding whether you are guilty or not, may draw such 
inferences as appear proper from your refusal to give evidence, including inferences 
that may be adverse to you. 
Let me also say, whichever course you take, it is open to you to call other evidence in 
your own defence. You may confer with your counsel on the course you wish to take. 
 
I now call upon you to give evidence in your own defence. How do you elect?‖ 
 
V         Alternative Approach: Introduction of an Intermediary System for     
Vulnerable Accused in the Malaysian Criminal Trial 
A Malaysian Criminal Procedure Code 
Section 112A Examination of witnesses by police in the presence of an 
intermediary. 
(1)A person who falls under the definition of vulnerable person for the purpose 
of this Code may be allowed to be examined by the police in the presence of 
an intermediary. 
(2)Application for intermediary may be made by the person or the person‘s 
counsel or a police officer of that police station 
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Section 258A Examination of accused through intermediary 
(1)This section applies to any proceedings (whether in a magistrates' court or before 
the High Court) against a person for an offence.  
(2)The court may, on the application of the accused, give a direction under subsection 
(3) if it is satisfied—  
(a)that the conditions  in section 2 of the Code are met  in relation to a 
vulnerable person, and  
(b)that making the direction is necessary in order to ensure that the accused 
receives a fair trial.  
(3)A direction under this subsection is a direction that provides for any examination 
of the accused to be conducted through an interpreter or other person approved by the 
court for the purposes of this section (―an intermediary‖).  
(4)The function of an intermediary is to communicate—  
(a)to the accused, questions put to the accused, and  
(b)to any person asking such questions, the answers given by the accused in 
reply to them,  
and to explain such questions or answers so far as necessary to enable them to be 
understood by the accused or the person in question.  
(5)Any examination of the accused in pursuance of a direction under subsection (3) 
must take place in the presence of such persons and in circumstances in which—  
(a)the judge or justices (or both) and legal representatives acting in the 
proceedings are able to see and hear the examination of the accused and to 
communicate with the intermediary,  
(b)where there are two or more accused in the proceedings, each of the other 
accused is able to see and hear the examination of the accused.  
For the purposes of this subsection any impairment of eyesight or hearing is to be 
disregarded.  
(6)Where two or more legal representatives are acting for a party to the proceedings, 
subsection (5)(a) is to be regarded as satisfied in relation to those representatives if at 
all material times it is satisfied in relation to at least one of them.  
(7)A person may not act as an intermediary in a particular case except after making a 
declaration, that the person will faithfully perform the function of an intermediary.  
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(8)Section 191 of the Penal Code (giving false evidence) applies in relation to a 
person acting as an intermediary as it applies in relation to a person lawfully sworn as 
an interpreter in a judicial proceeding 
 
VI Other Modes of Assistance: Support Persons 
A Malaysian Criminal Procedure Code 
Section 258B Support persons 
(1) The Court may allow a vulnerable person to be accompanied by a support person 
while giving evidence in any proceedings. 
(2) The Court may permit more than one support person to accompany the vulnerable 
person if the Court considers it in the interests of justice to do so. 
(3) A vulnerable person who gives evidence in a proceeding to which this section 
applies is entitled to choose a person whom the vulnerable person would like to 
have present near him or her when giving evidence.  
(4) A support person accompanying the vulnerable person shall not— 
 
(a) prompt the vulnerable person to answer any question; 
(b) influence the answers of the vulnerable person ; or 
(c) disrupt the questioning of the vulnerable person. 
 
(5) Despite subsections (1) and (2), the Court may, in the interest of justice, direct that 
support may not be provided to a vulnerable person by— 
(a) any person; or 
(b) a particular person. 
 
(6) A vulnerable person who is to have a support person near him or her while     
giving evidence must, unless the Court orders otherwise, disclose to all parties as 
soon as practicable the name of each person who is to provide that support. 
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